3 ms·
This illustrates a very general problem in computer security: how do you know you can trust your hardware-firmware-software stack? It's not enough to simply tr
by lisper 9y ago
This illustrates a very general problem in computer security: how do you know you can trust your hardware-firmware-software stack? It's not enough to simply trust your vendor (c.f. the recent High Sierra root vulnerability). Even a vendor who says they are prioritizing security and has the technical chops to make that happen (like Apple) can make mistakes. Worse, unless they have really good internal auditing, a single dishonest employee can intentionally insert a vulnerability that can go unnoticed for a very long time (e.g. GOTO FAIL). If the stakes are high (e.g. you can walk away with a few hundred million dollars, or enable whatever intelligence agency you are loyal to to spy on hundreds of millions of people) then the incentive to insert a back door becomes equally high.
It is quite easy to create a pseudo-random number generator whose output is statistically indistinguishable from a real random number generator but is easily predictable to an attacker. (It's actually much easier to do this than to build a secure RNG.) This makes random number generators particularly attractive targets for attacks. Access to reliable random number generators is crucial for any kind of security, but is going to become increasingly challenging as time goes by.