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The original impetus for SSL/TLS was to permit credit card transactions. For a long time only banking websites and retail checkout pages were encrypted. In that
by wahern 9y ago
The original impetus for SSL/TLS was to permit credit card transactions. For a long time only banking websites and retail checkout pages were encrypted. In that light it makes more sense why the industry focused so heavily on certificate authorities. People were told never to enter their credit card number unless the "secure" icon was displayed; if it did, then they could trust the site much like they would trust any brick & mortar store.
Back in the early days you couldn't get a certificate without faxing in a copy of your business registration. A certificate authority's digital imprimatur implied something substantial about the credibility of a site, however imperfect the process. But as the certificate authority market diversified there was a race to the bottom in terms of credible certificate authorities. We've been at that bottom for so long that it does seem ridiculous that we didn't have Let's Encrypt earlier.
- kunimu 9y ago>For a long time only banking websites and retail checkout pages were encrypted. For my experience, this still holds in Japan, and I've heard in Korea.
- jchw 9y agoAnecdotal evidence, but for Japan that seems to be changing. Popular Japanese art site Pixiv rolled out TLS to the entire site in the past year or so, before that it was only used during login. As far as Korea goes, they've got a whole different bag of worms going on, at least for a couple more years. Look up "South Korea Internet Explorer" for some astounding stuff if you've not heard of this before.
- Fnoord 9y ago> Back in the early days you couldn't get a certificate without faxing in a copy of your business registration. Well well, guess who could easily spoof that one. > A certificate authority's digital imprimatur implied something substantial about the credibility of a site, however imperfect the process. Not just the process. SSL downplay attacks and lack of certificate pinning already existed back in those days. As long as those attacks are unknown you may still be reasonably secure against a MITM from a banana state government or a random ISP. Also, lets not forget that running your entire website on HTTPS was expensive on resources before the 10s. So the argument "because we can" makes sense. That doesn't mean all that information has to be encrypted. However, if you want to harm a surveillance state, then one act is causing significant noise. Uninteresting, encrypted data is noise and potentially yields plausible deniability. The other argument is "because we have to". Different attacks have been demonstrated on that one: hostile networks such as ISPs injecting ads, hijacking DNS, open WiFi, impersonating fraudulent websites are just a few examples.
- wlll 9y ago> Well well, guess who could easily spoof [faxing in a copy of your business registration]. I worked for an ISP in 2000 and we had to both send and receive faxes on "company headed notepaper" as a means of authenticating a request. All you needed was a word doc with the company name in bold at the top of the page. When we hit this particular bureaucratic speed bump (mostly dealing with domain name registrars), and having no "company headed notepaper" ourselves (we were 20 people) we just fabricated it. It always worked.