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Joanna's (Qubes OS Founder) blog [1] is a gold mine when it comes to hardware-software boundary security. Especially "State considered harmful" [2] and "x86 con
by magnat 9y ago
Joanna's (Qubes OS Founder) blog [1] is a gold mine when it comes to hardware-software boundary security. Especially "State considered harmful" [2] and "x86 considered harmful" [3] papers are eye-openers.
[1] https://blog.invisiblethings.org/ https://blog.invisiblethings.org/
[2] https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.p...
[3] https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf
- jstewartmobile 9y agoThat's why I don't get Qubes. She knows what a steaming pile PC hardware is, and decides to write a spinoff OS for it??? Seems like she'd have more effect designing hardware.
- dillon 9y agoI believe I remember reading she aims at solving the issue of hardware and software vulnerabilities. I can't find the source, but she mentions that there's too much code out there that it would be impossible to secure everything. Qubes' design means hardware and software are all separated so a vulnerability in one doesn't mean exposing another. I like that in their docs they mention an approach they take and when it isn't secure[0] That being said the main point of security contention is the admin (dom0). [0]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/copy-paste/ https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/copy-paste/
- jstewartmobile 9y agoBut those two things are not independent. If your hardware is fundamentally broken, hypervisors can only paper over so much. Between the twilight of Moore's law, and the success of open-source software, I just don't see that much long-term value left in x86+PC.
- fghtr 9y agoI think you mean this paper: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.p...
- nickik 9y agoIt is a lot easier to do the best you can with tech that exists. Building a completly new type of computer and and OS is not easy. She is working on hardware but that is not as easy to bring into the wider world.
- rdiddly 9y agoQ: Would the steaming pile be stinkier with an easy way to deploy & use VMs to separate things, or without? A: Stinkier without, therefore Qubes.
- jstewartmobile 9y agoThat's assuming the virtualization extensions are doing their job, and the other parts of the processor aren't leaking anything, and that Xen doesn't have any problems, and that the Qubes additions are solid, and that various interactions between these layers won't present any other problems, and probably a few other things... I'd consider betting on one of those things being solid on its own, but not all of them together.
- rdiddly 9y agoWell it obviously doesn't compete with whatever you're currently doing that solves all the same problems perfectly.
- jstewartmobile 9y agoWhy does it have to get personal rdiddly? If you've spent any time with Intel's phone-book-sized opcode manual, or following the history of the PC, you get real skeptical when the words "secure" and "PC" are mentioned together.
- jstanley 9y agoHe's not getting personal. You're being a bit unreasonable. Why are you pointing the finger at Qubes for not solving every problem there is? It's doing a much better job than ~every other Linux distro.
- rdiddly 9y agoApologies for the sarcasm, really I'm just wondering what you're using then. To me there's no "secure" and "insecure," there's only "more secure" and "less secure."
- feelin_googley 9y agoI think the Qubes website is also quite useful for informational purposes. Example, found through Qubes website: http://pete.akeo.ie/2011/06/crafting-bios-from-scratch.html http://pete.akeo.ie/2011/06/crafting-bios-from-scratch.html
- ryacko 9y agoApparently she wants to move state to another device that is portable? I think realistically state is hard to avoid unless you are using disposable read-only memory.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]