4 ms·
That does not make much sense. US companies have always needed to hand over information when presented with a warrant from LE or the FBI, I don't think that was
by willstrafach 9y ago
That does not make much sense. US companies have always needed to hand over information when presented with a warrant from LE or the FBI, I don't think that was ever denied by a US company.
In Apple's case, this would be any iCloud data which they can access and is not encrypted (such as contacts or calendar entries). However, the OP was referring to something completely different: Government attempts to force Apple to weaken data-at-rest encryption on everyone's devices.
It is fine if you believe that sealed/secret warrants are problematic, but it seems strange to equate that with the weakening of security for all.
- indubitable 9y agoIt seems you're conflating a couple of our surveillance programs. PRISM operates in coordination and active cooperation with a relatively small number of US companies, including Apple. There is a rubber stamp warrant, of our secret court approves over 99%. The type and amount of information accessed here is extensive and includes encrypted and personal information - as well as even real time access to user accounts. You can see the NSA slides on PRISM here: https://archive.org/details/NSA-PRISM-Slides https://archive.org/details/NSA-PRISM-Slides As an example of this, the NSA has real-time access to encrypted Skype conversations: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s... The breadth of information being collected was increasing quite rapidly, and everything I'm basing this this one is from 3-4 years ago. Another surveillance program, that you seem to be conflating with PRISM, is MUSCULAR. That program is not as well known as PRISM. And it does what you're suggesting in directly tapping communication lines grabbing data from everywhere and archiving everything. Naturally anything that was sent on those lines unencrypted (or is otherwise able to be exploited) is then openly available. One significant difference from PRISM is that this is done without even a rubber stamping of warrants. Your post seemed to be describing the less 'cooperative' capacities of MUSCULAR with the token oversight of PRISM. The problem that I see here is that most people are incredibly poorly informed on our surveillance programs, which include extensive domestic surveillance. And that is a shame, because in order for there to be progressive change people need to understand the current state of the situation. It's like discussing a budget when you think you have a billion dollars in the bank, but in reality you're already in the red - the sense of urgency, which should be there, has been artificially removed.