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> Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual int

by dvt 9y ago

> Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. I don't think you're right. See here[1]: > There is a limited use for such interpretations of subjects' protocols, I have argued (Dennett 1978a; 1979, esp., pp.109-110; 1982), but they will not help the defenders of qualia here. Logical constructs out of judgments must be viewed as akin to theorists' fictions, and the friends of qualia want the existence of a particular quale in any particular case to be an empirical fact in good standing, not a theorist's useful interpretive fiction, else it will not loom as a challenge to functionalism or materialism or third-person, objective science. According to the man himself, he thinks that they are "theorists' fictions" and "not empirical facts" -- that's about as "they aren't a thing" as you can possibly get. [1] http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm

pdonis 9y ago
If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind. However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. Another way of looking at this is to ask what, exactly, the word "qualia" refers to. If it refers to subjective experiences themselves, then of course they exist; but, as Dennett says, they might not be what most people think they are. But if the word "qualia" refers to something else, then what it refers to might indeed not even exist. Many philosophical arguments come down to people using words to mean different things and talking past each other.
- dvt 9y ago
  > However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1] PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;) [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5 http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5
  - dwaltrip 9y ago
    > Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Care to elaborate on this? From my angle, arguments if this sort tend to veer towards wild speculation. I understand others feel differently. I usually can't help but read it as unnecessary leaps of logic spurred by some presupposed metaphysics. I hope I'm not projecting too much here -- you may have a more considerate take on things.
    - dvt 9y ago
      > Care to elaborate on this? Elaborate on what, exactly? Qualia being phenomenal properties of experience? I think that's a pretty atomic claim. Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale. It's debated whether or not qualia are the same across people[1] (but my intuition is yes). Empiricists like Dennett argue that you don't need qualia and that they are a sort of unnecessary hand-wavy magic. [1] http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/gradmind01/newpapers/Comparing%20Qualia.htm http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/gradmind01/newpap...

by dvt 9y ago

pdonis 9y ago

If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind. However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. Another way of looking at this is to ask what, exactly, the word "qualia" refers to. If it refers to subjective experiences themselves, then of course they exist; but, as Dennett says, they might not be what most people think they are. But if the word "qualia" refers to something else, then what it refers to might indeed not even exist. Many philosophical arguments come down to people using words to mean different things and talking past each other.

dvt 9y ago
> However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1] PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;) [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5 http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5
- dwaltrip 9y ago
  > Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Care to elaborate on this? From my angle, arguments if this sort tend to veer towards wild speculation. I understand others feel differently. I usually can't help but read it as unnecessary leaps of logic spurred by some presupposed metaphysics. I hope I'm not projecting too much here -- you may have a more considerate take on things.
  - dvt 9y ago
    > Care to elaborate on this? Elaborate on what, exactly? Qualia being phenomenal properties of experience? I think that's a pretty atomic claim. Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale. It's debated whether or not qualia are the same across people[1] (but my intuition is yes). Empiricists like Dennett argue that you don't need qualia and that they are a sort of unnecessary hand-wavy magic. [1] http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/gradmind01/newpapers/Comparing%20Qualia.htm http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/gradmind01/newpap...