4 ms·

Dennet is a reductive materialist. He'd probably disagree with my hardline depiction of him, but, in my opinion, if it quacks like a duck and swims like a duck,

by dvt 9y ago

Dennet is a reductive materialist. He'd probably disagree with my hardline depiction of him, but, in my opinion, if it quacks like a duck and swims like a duck, it's probably a duck. For what it's worth, he identifies as a 'teleofunctionalist' (???). The author of the piece doesn't seem to be a reductive materialist, so obviously Dennet won't jive with him. I'm also not a materialist, so I don't really find Dennet very insightful. For example, he denies the existence of qualia (and rejects everything that comes with that experience; see Nagel's famous What is it like to be a bat?). With that said, I think he's made some pretty big contributions to materialism, in particular with regards to evolutionary theory and by providing some pretty solid theories of an 'emergent' non-hand-wavy consciousness. I don't really agree with his points and I think he's being crudely reductive, but dismissing the man's life work is kind of unfair.

pdonis 9y ago
> he denies the existence of qualia No, he doesn't. He just says that qualia aren't what we intuitively think they are. Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. It's quite true that Dennett's view of qualia is very different from that of many other philosophers. But to say he denies the existence of qualia does not come close to doing justice to his actual views.
- dvt 9y ago
  > Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. I don't think you're right. See here[1]: > There is a limited use for such interpretations of subjects' protocols, I have argued (Dennett 1978a; 1979, esp., pp.109-110; 1982), but they will not help the defenders of qualia here. Logical constructs out of judgments must be viewed as akin to theorists' fictions, and the friends of qualia want the existence of a particular quale in any particular case to be an empirical fact in good standing, not a theorist's useful interpretive fiction, else it will not loom as a challenge to functionalism or materialism or third-person, objective science. According to the man himself, he thinks that they are "theorists' fictions" and "not empirical facts" -- that's about as "they aren't a thing" as you can possibly get. [1] http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
  - pdonis 9y ago
    If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind. However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. Another way of looking at this is to ask what, exactly, the word "qualia" refers to. If it refers to subjective experiences themselves, then of course they exist; but, as Dennett says, they might not be what most people think they are. But if the word "qualia" refers to something else, then what it refers to might indeed not even exist. Many philosophical arguments come down to people using words to mean different things and talking past each other.
    - dvt 9y ago
      > However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1] PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;) [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5 http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5
      - dwaltrip 9y ago
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
escherplex 9y ago
How are you going to formulate an objective phenomenological description of a subjective space which serves as a personal reification substrate for broadcast of 'qualia' models formulated from percepts and concepts by a received personal cognitive operating system? As you know, one school locks on to a 'bubbling-up' dy/dx = -yx and survival utility as overlords with 'consciousness' (whatever that is) as an emergent property supervening on a material substrate. Resonates OK if one's received nature/nurture is conformal to that description but how was/is what is experienced as 'order' possible? Ultimately it has to be postulated as a-priori predilections since order and chaos are strange bedfellows. Another school postulates 'consciousness is the only reality' a-priori with all as projections of some intentionality field. David Bohme seemed to subscribe to that principle since in 'The Undivided Universe - An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory' he postulates three spaces: 1) intentionality, 2) stochastic (only virtual Schrodinger's cats there) and 3) an objective or reified space (here). But as the original article concludes 'qui sait?'. Maybe epoché is more appropriate.
- sgt101 9y ago
  I think "bubblers up" would say that order arises from utility in the sense that initial "bubbles" happen in simple organisms and enable them to become more complex and successful. They would argue that those that did not acquire ordering and editing would be unable to step further along the path because the utility of the created mechanism for survival and reproduction is low. The broadcast of qualia models element that you include feels debatable to me; the transmission of concepts and ideas is surely very new and anomalous in the history of the development of aware and experiencing entities if one accepts that consciousness is something that has developed and evolved.
taxicabjesus 9y ago
> Dennet is a reductive materialist. "Materialism: 1a: a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter. scientific materialism" [1] [1] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialist https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialist Materialism became the guiding philosophy of Science in ~1845. Reductionism was all the rage. I think materialism is losing its stranglehold on scientific progress ('science advances one funeral at a time'). There was a submission a few days ago titled "physics has demoted mass" [3] [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15679150 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15679150 My experience is that the universe is probably more intricate than we can imagine.
- n4r9 9y ago
  That article is in no way an attack on materialism. Quantum chromodynamics still constitutes a materialist understanding of the universe. Are you perhaps confusing "matter" and "mass"?
  - taxicabjesus 9y ago
    My point was that this old Philosophy is preventing progress. The stranglehold is most evident, to me, when self-appointed thought-leaders apply Materialism/Reductionism to medicine.
    - n4r9 9y ago
      Do you have an example of what you're talking about?
  - dwaltrip 9y ago
    "Mass" is well defined. "Matter", less so. https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mass-and-matter-1 https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mass-an...

by dvt 9y ago

pdonis 9y ago

> he denies the existence of qualia No, he doesn't. He just says that qualia aren't what we intuitively think they are. Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. It's quite true that Dennett's view of qualia is very different from that of many other philosophers. But to say he denies the existence of qualia does not come close to doing justice to his actual views.

dvt 9y ago
> Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. I don't think you're right. See here[1]: > There is a limited use for such interpretations of subjects' protocols, I have argued (Dennett 1978a; 1979, esp., pp.109-110; 1982), but they will not help the defenders of qualia here. Logical constructs out of judgments must be viewed as akin to theorists' fictions, and the friends of qualia want the existence of a particular quale in any particular case to be an empirical fact in good standing, not a theorist's useful interpretive fiction, else it will not loom as a challenge to functionalism or materialism or third-person, objective science. According to the man himself, he thinks that they are "theorists' fictions" and "not empirical facts" -- that's about as "they aren't a thing" as you can possibly get. [1] http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
- pdonis 9y ago
  If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind. However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. Another way of looking at this is to ask what, exactly, the word "qualia" refers to. If it refers to subjective experiences themselves, then of course they exist; but, as Dennett says, they might not be what most people think they are. But if the word "qualia" refers to something else, then what it refers to might indeed not even exist. Many philosophical arguments come down to people using words to mean different things and talking past each other.
  - dvt 9y ago
    > However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are. I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1] PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;) [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5 http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5
    - dwaltrip 9y ago

deleted 9y ago

[deleted]

escherplex 9y ago

How are you going to formulate an objective phenomenological description of a subjective space which serves as a personal reification substrate for broadcast of 'qualia' models formulated from percepts and concepts by a received personal cognitive operating system? As you know, one school locks on to a 'bubbling-up' dy/dx = -yx and survival utility as overlords with 'consciousness' (whatever that is) as an emergent property supervening on a material substrate. Resonates OK if one's received nature/nurture is conformal to that description but how was/is what is experienced as 'order' possible? Ultimately it has to be postulated as a-priori predilections since order and chaos are strange bedfellows. Another school postulates 'consciousness is the only reality' a-priori with all as projections of some intentionality field. David Bohme seemed to subscribe to that principle since in 'The Undivided Universe - An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory' he postulates three spaces: 1) intentionality, 2) stochastic (only virtual Schrodinger's cats there) and 3) an objective or reified space (here). But as the original article concludes 'qui sait?'. Maybe epoché is more appropriate.

sgt101 9y ago
I think "bubblers up" would say that order arises from utility in the sense that initial "bubbles" happen in simple organisms and enable them to become more complex and successful. They would argue that those that did not acquire ordering and editing would be unable to step further along the path because the utility of the created mechanism for survival and reproduction is low. The broadcast of qualia models element that you include feels debatable to me; the transmission of concepts and ideas is surely very new and anomalous in the history of the development of aware and experiencing entities if one accepts that consciousness is something that has developed and evolved.

taxicabjesus 9y ago

> Dennet is a reductive materialist. "Materialism: 1a: a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter. scientific materialism" [1] [1] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialist https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialist Materialism became the guiding philosophy of Science in ~1845. Reductionism was all the rage. I think materialism is losing its stranglehold on scientific progress ('science advances one funeral at a time'). There was a submission a few days ago titled "physics has demoted mass" [3] [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15679150 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15679150 My experience is that the universe is probably more intricate than we can imagine.

n4r9 9y ago
That article is in no way an attack on materialism. Quantum chromodynamics still constitutes a materialist understanding of the universe. Are you perhaps confusing "matter" and "mass"?
- taxicabjesus 9y ago
  My point was that this old Philosophy is preventing progress. The stranglehold is most evident, to me, when self-appointed thought-leaders apply Materialism/Reductionism to medicine.
  - n4r9 9y ago
    Do you have an example of what you're talking about?
- dwaltrip 9y ago
  "Mass" is well defined. "Matter", less so. https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mass-and-matter-1 https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mass-an...