I still disagree, for several reasons: 1) "virtue-signaling" is an idiom that doesn't directly map to the economic concept in contract theory, so you are speci

I still disagree, for several reasons: 1) "virtue-signaling" is an idiom that doesn't directly map to the economic concept in contract theory, so you are specifying a definition the original commenter was probably not using (it's closer to evolutionary signaling), 2) even if we assume the definition of economic signaling, unless there is a special definition for anonymity in the economic context that both you and the commenter share, it is not necessary for two individuals honestly signaling about themselves to deanonymize themselves in order to enter into a contract, 3) more pertinently to #2, I could use examples of theoretical cryptography here, but we already have applied examples: it is possible to enter into smart contracts where both parties are anonymous. It takes ~33 bits of meaningful information to uniquely identify anyone. Using the example from Wikipedia: someone betting on a sports team might be sending a signal about their own identity as a fan, but that signal is not sufficient to deanonymize them (many people are pessimistic about any given team) and it may not be honest (they may simply be a pessimistic fan).