The first supposed "lie" here isn't even mentioned. I guess the criticism fits an (unmentioned) statement that the government is trying to improve cybersecurity

The first supposed "lie" here isn't even mentioned. I guess the criticism fits an (unmentioned) statement that the government is trying to improve cybersecurity. But while I have heard that in general terms, I don't remember it coming up in the crypto debate–and would be surprised, considering I can't think of the logic that would connect the two. The second supposed "lie" is possibly the closest to reality. Although there are plenty of people who would agree that there is something of a difference between "not encrypted" and "encrypted, but the NSA has a a separate key that can decrypt it". Like everyone who thinks TLS isn't completely broken. The third is simply a conspiracy theory. Don't be surprised if the press, and anybody who isn't already on your side, laughs at you if show up with an argument about how it's all a plan by the NSA/Congress/Disney to control money/brains/Hitler's secret moon base. Packaging such weak arguments in the language of "lies" weakens your position if you're trying to defend the public's right to strong encryption. Because people will focus on your assumptions that they know to be wrong, such as the government being on some super-secret mission to get your bitcoin or whatever. And they will extrapolate from there. Instead, start from shared assumption, and build good will, before making actual, strong arguments. One such basis would be acknowledging that, yes, some hypothetical, completely ethical, FBI agent may today have a harder time, because where they would previously find lots of incriminating documents in nicely labelled binders, today a search may often just result in an USB stick with binary gibberish. Once you've build some rapport, this would be a real argument: I don't trust judicial oversight, because it has been abused too often by, for example, the FISA court and national security letters. Moreover, the government's surveillance powers were previously limited in two less-excplicit ways than judicial oversight, namely the costs and manpower involved with physically searching a place, and surveilling people, as well the nature of such actions as being publicly visible. But these safeguards do not apply to electronic surveillance, making it too likely that such powers will be used in massive operations without probable cause.