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It's fairly straightforward to prove that score voting does not violate the conditions of Arrow. For example, adding an additional candidate should not affect

It's fairly straightforward to prove that score voting does not violate the conditions of Arrow. For example, adding an additional candidate should not affect the average score of the rest of the candidates, hence there is no problem with "independence of irrelevant alternatives". (I leave the rest of the conditions as an exercise to the interested reader.) That having been said, all voting systems can be vulnerable to strategic considerations. However, simulations and theory suggest it's much less the case for score voting compared to ranked choice systems. See electology.org for some pointers to research.

Bromskloss 9y ago
> For example, adding an additional candidate should not affect the average score of the rest of the candidates, hence there is no problem with "independence of irrelevant alternatives". It is non-obvious to me that rational voters in such a situation should not adjust their scores for the initial candidates. In fact, it seems like you should adjust scores in the prototypical situation where you prefer candidate A to candidate B, and detest candidate C. With only A and B present, you give A a high score and B a low score. When C enters the picture, you change your score for B to a high one, so that you make it maximally difficult for C to win.