5 ms·
I think you're being overly paranoid. If the attacker has physical access to the machine, chances are you're compromised anyway, even before this vulnerability.
by maccard 9y ago
I think you're being overly paranoid. If the attacker has physical access to the machine, chances are you're compromised anyway, even before this vulnerability.
- vog 9y agoI wonder how long it will take until an attack over the network is found.
- turblety 9y agoYou mean another one? [1] 1. https://thehackernews.com/2017/05/intel-amt-vulnerability.html https://thehackernews.com/2017/05/intel-amt-vulnerability.ht...
- richmarr 9y agoSo you're saying things are so bad anyway that this one vulnerability probably doesn't make any difference? This interpretation of "you're being overly paranoid" is new to me ;)
- sametmax 9y agoCome on, you can already catch aids, why do you worry about cancer ?
- breakingcups 9y agoI don't think thats the right attitude. There's a difference between being able to open a machine to install malicious hardware / steal hdd's or just plugging in a generic USB stick to pawn it. I know some of you might argue that even generic USB sticks can do damage and, whilst I agree, this attack is still a degree worse than most of those. Thus far the most damage an unknown USB stick could do was type commands as a fake keyboard (visible to user) or exploit a driver vulnerability to silently cause mischief. Correct me if I'm wrong, but those cases could still be trivially stopped by a security policy set by administrators disallowing unknown USB devices. (Of course, how many places would use this is another matter, but it's still very important for places where this does matter.) This attack on the other hand would seem to be able to completely bypass your operating systems restrictions on USB ports.
- fragmede 9y agoFrom a technical perspective there is a difference now that this is public, but from a security stance, physical access is physical access. Why? Security knows there are always bugs in software, and assumes they exist. Thanks to @h0t_max, the rest of us know this particular bug exists, but this bug has been around for a while - who's to say evil hax0rs didn't find this bug years ago and have been exploiting it since? Or put another way - you say an unknown USB stick could exploit a driver vulnerability to silently cause mischief, and then claim that this is easily stopped if an administrator sets a security policy to disallow unknown USB devices. (I assume you mean a Windows GPO enforced policy or similar, and not a written social policy.) Who's to say the code that enforces the policy doesn't have bugs that's exploitable? What if the driver for a known USB stick has exploits? Physical access is physical access, and while there are mitigations for the evil maid attack (like an encrypted drive and shutting down -not just suspending, when the machine is out of sight), there simply is no way around the fact that physical access is game over.
- cyphar 9y ago> while there are mitigations for the evil maid attack (like an encrypted drive and shutting down -not just suspending, when the machine is out of sight), That mitigation is useless against Evil Maid. There are much more sophisticated mitigations (using a TPM to measure the boot, and then do something akin to TOTP in order to allow the user to actually verify the state of the machine) which actually could protect against Evil Maid almost completely (assuming you don't have something like Intel ME that cannot be verified by the TPM). "Once you have physical access it's game over" is a very common response to these discussions, and I find it incredibly defeatist. Of course physical access means that the "clock is ticking" until your data is compromised, but sufficient protections can dampen the impact or increase the difficulty. For example: IOMMU protects against DMA-based attacks, something that was impossible to protect against several years ago. This doesn't mean that someone cannot launch other attacks, but it does mean that the trivial "just plug anything into a USB port and you have DMA" attack is no longer possible.
- my123 9y ago
- nolok 9y agoAs I said above; I think I didn't make my point clear enough: my concern was not about it making it easier to be comprised, but about it making the clean up pretty impossible, on a hardware level. Software do-over is a very well accepted solution (don't bother cleaning the rootkit, just format reinstall), but hardware do-over (change the cpu) is going to be a hard pill to swallow.
- cyphar 9y agoThis was a problem even before Intel ME. Modern server motherboards (and several workstations) have a second Linux installation on your motherboard (known as a "baseboard management controller" or BMC) that cannot be removed. There have been many exploits found in the software running on BMCs, and if you want to "clean up" an infected server then you have to throw out the hardware if you want to be 100% certain.
- shenki0 9y agoThe bmc situation is changing. There's an effort to support the ARM SoCs upstream, and there are a number of companies working on open source BMC stacks. https://github.com/openbmc https://github.com/openbmc
- sametmax 9y agoFor now. You need a first step before the next. I'm waiting for them to own ME remotely now. It's unlikely they won't succeed.
- gaius 9y agoIf the attacker has physical access to the machine, chances are you're compromised anyway, even before this vulnerability Can you not see the difference between an attacker opening the case and stealing your HD, vs inserting USB key for a few seconds, then going away, and exploiting later at their leisure?