I think you're the one confusing reality with matter. Nobody ever cared about anybody's diary as a physical artifact. What matters (pun intended) is the informa

I think you're the one confusing reality with matter. Nobody ever cared about anybody's diary as a physical artifact. What matters (pun intended) is the information. The way to fight for strong privacy isn't to run around screaming how "these people just don't GET it!". Because they will look at the framed Math PhD certificate on the wall and rightfully conclude that you're starting from wrong assumptions. Instead, start by imagine the most perfect FBI agents you can. Then, debate them. That debate must start with agreeing that your idealized agent does indeed have a harder job when all evidence moves from binders full of incriminating paper to an encrypted, impenetrable blob. Not accepting that truth makes you useless for your cause, because nobody who isn't already a convert will listen to you if you deny reality with ill-fitting analogies. Only then can you make your case, the two main arguments of which should be: - It is impossible to weaken encryption without running the risk of those weaknesses being exploited, or the keys to the backdoor, falling into the hands of bad actors. - The ability to automate electronic surveillance potentially increases the quantity of surveillance to a point where it also takes on a different quality. Even if judicial oversight remained (which is questionable, considering FISA et al), privacy invasion was previously limited by two informal, yet important, caveats: the costs and resources required to have agents physically search, and the public visibility of such searches.