3 ms·
I had another comment, but in response to your Ed: comment: key size is not a measure of security. It is a measure of how /long/ we intend the key to be secure
by olliej 9y ago
I had another comment, but in response to your Ed: comment:
key size is not a measure of security. It is a measure of how /long/ we intend the key to be secure.
More explicitly:
Key size does not exist of the gradient of protocol security.
We know how long a key takes to break given current technology and algorithms. We choose a key size to render the time to break infeasible against our prediction of state of the art some amount of time in the future. If there's a gradient, the gradient isn't "how secure it is", its "how long it will remain secure".
Hence any policy that endeavours to control the "strength" of encryption through controls over key length is /necessarily/ requiring an insecure key size.
It can be put this simply: How small must the key be to allow it to be "good enough" for the DoJ? Would they accept a continuous 5 years on a 10000 gpus? Noting of course that in 18-24 months that key size will now only require 2.5 years, then 1.25, 7 months, 3 months...
Of course I'm sure 5 years and millions of dollars will be "unreasonable", so it would need to take less time, and cost less.
- SomeStupidPoint 9y agoSincere question: how do you define "how secure it is" except "how long it will remain secure (under attack)"? Edit: You're also completely eliding that security is probabilistic -- they might just guess our key on the first try. We can only discuss it as the expected amount of computation to figure out our key on average. That expected amount has a gradient along keysize.
- olliej 9y agoA protocol is secure if, and only if, the fastest attack is an attack on the key itself. All of the recent crypto breaks (that not cause by prior key size restrictions req'd by gov agencies) have been protocol flaws, e.g. flaws in the protocol allowed you to derive the key without having to just explore the entire key space. Anything other than deriving the plaintext of encrypted data alone would mean the protocol was insecure. That said, I am coming to agree with you in terms of trying to explain to people who don't write crypto code that saying key size is gradient of security is probably the most sensible thing. I still disagree with you on the actual statement :D
- zodiac 9y agoHe meant "how long before technology advances, due to Moore's Law or whatever, to the point where it's really cheap to brute force the key space". Not "how long it takes from the moment you attack it to the moment you break it"
- fulafel 9y agoThe "how long" is fits well with some other estabilished measures of security we use. For example, safes are designed to resist entry for a certain length of time. In military, defenses are often quantified by how long they should be able to hold back a presumed attack scenario.
- crankylinuxuser 9y agoBut thanks to math, we jumped from safes that can withstand hours of attack to math that can withstand every computer on this planet for the next 1e7 years before being cracked. The problem with what others have posited as "money based encryption" easily scales up with AWS, Azure, GCE, and private clouds. Even individuals can buy a large cloud for 1h for cheap and crack with rainbow tables or such. But for a real safe, I can go get a thermic lance. It nicely cuts inside most safes. Or I can use a bunch of liquid nitrogen and freeze-shatter it.
- AstralStorm 9y agoThose 1e7 numbers are highly speculative actually. Decade or two is more reliable as a prediction. (Just remember we might have big quantum computers soon.) These vastly speed up even dumb attacks against the passwords. (Not even keys.)