It looks like we share a similar enthusiasm for the potential of artificial neural networks (and I also assume a similar distrust in the ability of philosophy t

It looks like we share a similar enthusiasm for the potential of artificial neural networks (and I also assume a similar distrust in the ability of philosophy to answer these questions), and I agree that NNs are currently the best candidate to eventually create self-conscious machines (though unlike some prominent celebrities, I believe it's still in the far future). The point we depart is that you seem to be saying there is no real difference between the hard problem and the soft problem of consciousness. We obviously mean different things by "sensation": I've implemented neural nets to solve problems using ML, I understand the theory and certainly impressed with the results . I assume that by "sensations" you are referring to the process of inputs entering the input layer of the neural net. This is exactly part of a model for solving the soft problem of consciousness. What I'm getting at is that you know what a sensation feels like before you give it any label - it has a certain "is"ness to it that no equation or concept can convey. I'm saying this becomes possible when a system becomes complex enough to be self-conscious and it is usually attributed as some sort of emergent property that is created by the system, whereas I claim it is much deeper than that, and in fact it is the other way around. Obviously this correspondence format is not really suited to dive deeper, but I'm always happy to discuss this to find if and where I'm mistaken.