4 ms·

Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labelling it as duali

Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labelling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? What sort of math would result in those experiences? Here's another problem. You know about the physical/mathematical properties of the world by abstracting away from our experience of a world with color, sound, etc in it. Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass?

eli_gottlieb 9y ago
>Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labelling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? What sort of math would result in those experiences? Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained.
- westoncb 9y ago
  > Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained. Could you point to something related to predictive coding and control networks explaining anything phenomenological (or give an argument)? From what I can tell the two are completely orthogonal. Edit: I should add that my suspicion is you are mistaking a system which is isomorphic to relationships between phenomenological entities with something which could account for the presence of the entities themselves. I would recommend checking out the comment here from user 'theoh' on the "relations are what matters" perspective.
- goatlover 9y ago
  How do you get anything other than likely correlation from "Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain", and what does it have to do with physics or math? At most, you've provided a biological basis for consciousness. But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc?
  - yorwba 9y ago
    How would anybody ever get anything other than likely correlation?
    - deleted 9y ago
      [deleted]
    - visarga 9y ago
      In order to check a correlation we test it's causal predictive power in new situations. Causation has a special property that it can be used to simulate the future, while correlation does not.
    - goatlover 9y ago
      In physics there are causal explanations, and in math there are proofs. If the best you can do is correlation, then Y isn't explained by X.
  - visarga 9y ago
    > But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc? Because it doesn't exist in a vacuum, it exists inside an agent, that is inside the world. And the agent has to achieve a goal, to maximize utility, by learning to act intelligently. This creates a complex value system for states and actions. The values are used to select our actions, and we experience them as "qualia". So colors and pleasures are just sensory experiences accompanied by their action-values. In the end it's all a game, and qualia is generated by the game. We're mistakenly searching for qualia in the brain, while it was all around us, in the game itself. The brain is but one part of it.
  - eli_gottlieb 9y ago
    > But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc? Why wouldn't it? Not everyone shares your underinformed intuitions. Predictions about light are colors, predictions about reward are pleasure, etc.
justinpombrio 9y ago
> Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass? The same way that blind people do? > Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labeling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? I'm curious: what is a concrete answer that you would find satisfying? Even if it's unrealistic, or would only work in a different universe, what sort of answer are you looking for?
- goatlover 9y ago
  > The same way that blind people do? Color is a stand-in for any subjective (or creature-dependant) sensation, which would include sounds and feels. Remove those and epistemology collapses. > I'm curious: what is a concrete answer that you would find satisfying? Even if it's unrealistic, or would only work in a different universe, what sort of answer are you looking for? I have no idea. How to explain the subjective in terms of the objective? Why does such a division exist? It's a deep metaphysical question.
visarga 9y ago
> Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass? Most of abstract mathematics and philosophy deal in concepts that have no color, shape, or mass. And yet we deal with them. We don't need to have physical grounding for every concept.
- goatlover 9y ago
  You need sensory experiences to bootstrap your way to abstract concepts. Shape has no meaning without objects. Justice has no meaning without human interaction.
MrQuincle 9y ago
To build a system like that, you need: 1. A physical phenomenon, spectrum of light in this case. 2. An entity with a retina with light perceiving cells at the right bandwidth. 3. A network that represents an invariant concept at that bandwidth without too many dependencies on object and context. However, there might be visual illusions that are hard to get rid of. 4. If the entity needs to describe this concept to others you need a(nother) network that maps the concept to a sequence of utterances that maps to vocal cords or muscle movements for a keyboard. 5. If the entity has to be able to reason about the concept it needs to be able to store it for longer times and have flexible ways to combine it with other concepts. 6. If the entity needs retrospection of this behavior it needs to have a representation of itself.

eli_gottlieb 9y ago

>Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labelling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? What sort of math would result in those experiences? Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained.

westoncb 9y ago
> Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained. Could you point to something related to predictive coding and control networks explaining anything phenomenological (or give an argument)? From what I can tell the two are completely orthogonal. Edit: I should add that my suspicion is you are mistaking a system which is isomorphic to relationships between phenomenological entities with something which could account for the presence of the entities themselves. I would recommend checking out the comment here from user 'theoh' on the "relations are what matters" perspective.
goatlover 9y ago
How do you get anything other than likely correlation from "Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain", and what does it have to do with physics or math? At most, you've provided a biological basis for consciousness. But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc?
- yorwba 9y ago
  How would anybody ever get anything other than likely correlation?
  - deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]
  - visarga 9y ago
    In order to check a correlation we test it's causal predictive power in new situations. Causation has a special property that it can be used to simulate the future, while correlation does not.
  - goatlover 9y ago
    In physics there are causal explanations, and in math there are proofs. If the best you can do is correlation, then Y isn't explained by X.
- visarga 9y ago
  > But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc? Because it doesn't exist in a vacuum, it exists inside an agent, that is inside the world. And the agent has to achieve a goal, to maximize utility, by learning to act intelligently. This creates a complex value system for states and actions. The values are used to select our actions, and we experience them as "qualia". So colors and pleasures are just sensory experiences accompanied by their action-values. In the end it's all a game, and qualia is generated by the game. We're mistakenly searching for qualia in the brain, while it was all around us, in the game itself. The brain is but one part of it.
- eli_gottlieb 9y ago
  > But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc? Why wouldn't it? Not everyone shares your underinformed intuitions. Predictions about light are colors, predictions about reward are pleasure, etc.

justinpombrio 9y ago

> Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass? The same way that blind people do? > Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labeling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? I'm curious: what is a concrete answer that you would find satisfying? Even if it's unrealistic, or would only work in a different universe, what sort of answer are you looking for?

goatlover 9y ago
> The same way that blind people do? Color is a stand-in for any subjective (or creature-dependant) sensation, which would include sounds and feels. Remove those and epistemology collapses. > I'm curious: what is a concrete answer that you would find satisfying? Even if it's unrealistic, or would only work in a different universe, what sort of answer are you looking for? I have no idea. How to explain the subjective in terms of the objective? Why does such a division exist? It's a deep metaphysical question.

visarga 9y ago

> Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass? Most of abstract mathematics and philosophy deal in concepts that have no color, shape, or mass. And yet we deal with them. We don't need to have physical grounding for every concept.

goatlover 9y ago
You need sensory experiences to bootstrap your way to abstract concepts. Shape has no meaning without objects. Justice has no meaning without human interaction.

MrQuincle 9y ago

To build a system like that, you need: 1. A physical phenomenon, spectrum of light in this case. 2. An entity with a retina with light perceiving cells at the right bandwidth. 3. A network that represents an invariant concept at that bandwidth without too many dependencies on object and context. However, there might be visual illusions that are hard to get rid of. 4. If the entity needs to describe this concept to others you need a(nother) network that maps the concept to a sequence of utterances that maps to vocal cords or muscle movements for a keyboard. 5. If the entity has to be able to reason about the concept it needs to be able to store it for longer times and have flexible ways to combine it with other concepts. 6. If the entity needs retrospection of this behavior it needs to have a representation of itself.