Hey gfodor, I actually do agree with your line of thinking all the way up to and including logic gates with qualia—however, when you say: > I'm don't think tha

Hey gfodor, I actually do agree with your line of thinking all the way up to and including logic gates with qualia—however, when you say: > I'm don't think that is a sufficient argument to explain subjective experience, —I have to agree with that, and I haven't seen anything which makes me think a better justification might be forthcoming (from anyone, not just Tegmark), so I kind of stop there. My personal view on it is that qualia/subjectivity are just what it's like to actually be a thing ('on the inside' is kind of an approximate way of saying it). Considering the sorts of things that go on in human subjectivity (this time referring to objects appearing in it, not the medium itself), I suppose it is what it's like to be the part of the reality where a human brain is (actually I think it's only certain parts of human brains, probably related to executive function). In that case, I think a bunch of logic cates linked together in certain ways could end up having interesting 'internal aspects' (of course 'interesting' here is human-relative: who's to say the the parts of reality comprising trees aren't internally more interesting in some objective measure? (not that I think there is an objective measure for that.) But I qualify the above as just how I guess that things are, not an assertion that it's really the case or anything.