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> The fact remains that no entity can successfully prove to another entity that it has inner experience, so how would proving you have subjectivity to _your own

> The fact remains that no entity can successfully prove to another entity that it has inner experience, so how would proving you have subjectivity to _your own mind_ work? If you are trying to 'prove' subjectivity, in the sense of providing an argument for it, then you are missing the point: you already experience it directly by definition, so there is nothing to prove. > This is a bizarre and unsupportable statement. Clearly physical processes can carry out computation, which is a special case of mathematics ... I am arguing against the idea that the computation (i.e. the math part) carried out the physical process—not the other way around.

titzer 9y ago
> I am arguing against the idea that the computation (i.e. the math part) carried out the physical process—not the other way around. Ah, I see. But that follows directly from the computable universe hypothesis.
- westoncb 9y ago
  Right, which if I accepted we wouldn't be having this conversation :)
naasking 9y ago
> If you are trying to 'prove' subjectivity, in the sense of providing an argument for it, then you are missing the point: you already experience it directly by definition, so there is nothing to prove. I can also perceive that glasses of water magically break and reconstitute pencils, in what we now know to be an optical illusion. "Self-evident" observations stand only so long as they are consistent with all other observations. The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. Therefore, it should be discarded.
- westoncb 9y ago
  > The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity.
  - naasking 9y ago
    > We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity. We are, because an ontology that takes subjectivity as primitive/irreducible is different than an ontology that reduces apparent subjectivity via third-party objective facts. You subscribe to the former, I subscribe to the latter. It is precisely this distinction that differentiates materialists and dualists in the philosophy of mind.
    - placebo 9y ago
      I don't subscribe to either (and I'd venture to say neither does westoncb). My view is that both are flawed interpretations of reality. Both dualists and materialists assume "objects" to have some sort of independent existence and the argument between them is that the former claims there is something else that also exists while the latter claims nothing else exists. However ask yourself, what sort of existence test can any object (or concept for that matter) pass without the subjective knowing of it? The moment an ontology presumes either objects or subjects as the core premise of reality, it is already one step removed from it.
      - naasking 9y ago
        > However ask yourself, what sort of existence test can any object (or concept for that matter) pass without the subjective knowing of it? This question doesn't yield any insight, because it still leaves us with the question of the nature of subjectivity, a term you use with impunity but without definition! You seem to be implying that subjectivity and objects must form some sort of recursive relation, but this then already assumes subjectivity is irreducible and the question at hand is precisely whether such an elaborate construct is necessary. There's plenty of evidence hinting that we're just special pleading about consciousness's special properties.

titzer 9y ago

> I am arguing against the idea that the computation (i.e. the math part) carried out the physical process—not the other way around. Ah, I see. But that follows directly from the computable universe hypothesis.

westoncb 9y ago
Right, which if I accepted we wouldn't be having this conversation :)

naasking 9y ago

> If you are trying to 'prove' subjectivity, in the sense of providing an argument for it, then you are missing the point: you already experience it directly by definition, so there is nothing to prove. I can also perceive that glasses of water magically break and reconstitute pencils, in what we now know to be an optical illusion. "Self-evident" observations stand only so long as they are consistent with all other observations. The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. Therefore, it should be discarded.

westoncb 9y ago
> The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity.
- naasking 9y ago
  > We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity. We are, because an ontology that takes subjectivity as primitive/irreducible is different than an ontology that reduces apparent subjectivity via third-party objective facts. You subscribe to the former, I subscribe to the latter. It is precisely this distinction that differentiates materialists and dualists in the philosophy of mind.
  - placebo 9y ago
    I don't subscribe to either (and I'd venture to say neither does westoncb). My view is that both are flawed interpretations of reality. Both dualists and materialists assume "objects" to have some sort of independent existence and the argument between them is that the former claims there is something else that also exists while the latter claims nothing else exists. However ask yourself, what sort of existence test can any object (or concept for that matter) pass without the subjective knowing of it? The moment an ontology presumes either objects or subjects as the core premise of reality, it is already one step removed from it.
    - naasking 9y ago
      > However ask yourself, what sort of existence test can any object (or concept for that matter) pass without the subjective knowing of it? This question doesn't yield any insight, because it still leaves us with the question of the nature of subjectivity, a term you use with impunity but without definition! You seem to be implying that subjectivity and objects must form some sort of recursive relation, but this then already assumes subjectivity is irreducible and the question at hand is precisely whether such an elaborate construct is necessary. There's plenty of evidence hinting that we're just special pleading about consciousness's special properties.