5 ms·
> It baffles me that people ignore the fact that they have subjectivity when making these claims. Do they? Everyone is entitled to their unquestioned assumptio
by titzer 9y ago
> It baffles me that people ignore the fact that they have subjectivity when making these claims.
Do they? Everyone is entitled to their unquestioned assumptions as long as they state them outright and describe their parameters. I have yet to see dualists (which ultimately is at the base of this whole line of argumentation) admit that they posit subjective experience _without evidence_, since they equate asking questions and "seeing" things as subjective experience. It's worthwhile debating and deconstructing just exactly what that means before accepting it and its hoaky mystical follow-ons. The fact remains that no entity can successfully prove to another entity that it has inner experience, so how would proving you have subjectivity to _your own mind_ work? You can't, and probably, you don't bother, because it is somehow "self evident" that you have this property. The whole qualia and consciousness debate is riddled with circular reasoning about something that dualists just "feel." Well sometimes I feel like I might have the same thoughts as a jelly donut, go ahead and prove me wrong with math!
> I think people sort of push this point aside either by saying that qualia/subjectivity could be generated by math (or a computational process), and that's what really matters. But we have no examples of abstract math generating anything;
This is a bizarre and unsupportable statement. Clearly physical processes can carry out computation, which is a special case of mathematics (or vice versa, depending on what you got your doctorate in), and computation can produce statements in whatever language you desire, even English. Yes, chips and software stacks produce outputs, even in English. How is that not "generating" something? Ah, but you ask what is inside? Tons! There are gazillions of bits inside computers, and similarly gazillions of flashes in your neural circuitry. That's a whole lot of "inside". How do you know that it _doesn't_ feel like something to be all those twinkling bits? If you still accept without question that you do in fact have subjective experience, doesn't it stand to reason that if the neural network which absolutely definitely does correlate with your consciousness did feel like _anything_, then by definition it would have to feel like this?
- westoncb 9y ago> The fact remains that no entity can successfully prove to another entity that it has inner experience, so how would proving you have subjectivity to _your own mind_ work? If you are trying to 'prove' subjectivity, in the sense of providing an argument for it, then you are missing the point: you already experience it directly by definition, so there is nothing to prove. > This is a bizarre and unsupportable statement. Clearly physical processes can carry out computation, which is a special case of mathematics ... I am arguing against the idea that the computation (i.e. the math part) carried out the physical process—not the other way around.
- titzer 9y ago> I am arguing against the idea that the computation (i.e. the math part) carried out the physical process—not the other way around. Ah, I see. But that follows directly from the computable universe hypothesis.
- westoncb 9y agoRight, which if I accepted we wouldn't be having this conversation :)
- naasking 9y ago> If you are trying to 'prove' subjectivity, in the sense of providing an argument for it, then you are missing the point: you already experience it directly by definition, so there is nothing to prove. I can also perceive that glasses of water magically break and reconstitute pencils, in what we now know to be an optical illusion. "Self-evident" observations stand only so long as they are consistent with all other observations. The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. Therefore, it should be discarded.
- westoncb 9y ago> The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity.
- naasking 9y ago> We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity. We are, because an ontology that takes subjectivity as primitive/irreducible is different than an ontology that reduces apparent subjectivity via third-party objective facts. You subscribe to the former, I subscribe to the latter. It is precisely this distinction that differentiates materialists and dualists in the philosophy of mind.
- goatlover 9y agoColors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labelling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? What sort of math would result in those experiences? Here's another problem. You know about the physical/mathematical properties of the world by abstracting away from our experience of a world with color, sound, etc in it. Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass?
- eli_gottlieb 9y ago>Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labelling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from? What sort of math would result in those experiences? Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained.
- westoncb 9y ago> Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained. Could you point to something related to predictive coding and control networks explaining anything phenomenological (or give an argument)? From what I can tell the two are completely orthogonal. Edit: I should add that my suspicion is you are mistaking a system which is isomorphic to relationships between phenomenological entities with something which could account for the presence of the entities themselves. I would recommend checking out the comment here from user 'theoh' on the "relations are what matters" perspective.
- goatlover 9y agoHow do you get anything other than likely correlation from "Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain", and what does it have to do with physics or math? At most, you've provided a biological basis for consciousness. But why would any of that result in color, pleasure, etc?