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The coordinator will be open-sourced and in all seriousness, even bitcoin had a sort of coordinator in the beginning, people aren't even forced to use it/can by
by dutchbrit 9y ago
The coordinator will be open-sourced and in all seriousness, even bitcoin had a sort of coordinator in the beginning, people aren't even forced to use it/can bypass it, but it's recommended to use it for now. So your statement isn't 100% valid.
Regarding crypto, you can read their response & reasoning here: https://blog.iota.org/curl-disclosure-beyond-the-headline-1814048d08ef https://blog.iota.org/curl-disclosure-beyond-the-headline-18...
"The replacement Kerl hash function is unmodified KECCAK-384 that only converts its input and output from/to 243 trits to 48 bytes using basic two’s complement. KECCAK-384 is well vetted and researched."
- runeks 9y ago1. It doesn’t matter whether the software that implements the central coordinator is open source, because the entire challenge of creating digital money is decentralized trust. Chaumian Cash solved digital money with a central issuer long ago. 2. Bitcoin had no privileged nodes, nor does it now. All miners compete on the same terms. A central coordinator by definiton does not, or it wouldn’t be centralized.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- comex 9y agoJust to clarify, since I misread your quote and think others might as well: > "The replacement Kerl hash function is unmodified KECCAK-384 that only converts its input and output from/to 243 trits to 48 bytes using basic two’s complement. KECCAK-384 is well vetted and researched." "Replacement" really does mean replacement, i.e. what they substituted in after the researchers successfully attacked their original hash function. (The new one is called "Kerl" and the old one is called "Curl", which seems confusing.) I'm not sure how asserting that the replacement is well-researched addresses the OP's point that their history of (a) rolling their own hash function, and (b) not adequately considering differential cryptanalysis, is a red flag. True, that specific vulnerability can now be considered fixed, which might not be clear from the OP's post - but it's still evidence of incompetence, which doesn't bode well for the quality of the rest of their design.
- Aledgerly 9y agoThis is a common misunderstanding. IOTA never deployed a vulnerable hashfunction. They had precautionary measures in place and thus had Curl there to test it out, which worked out brilliantly. Keep in mind that IOTA asked the team to attack Curl, not the other way around. This was planned. Curl is meant to be a lightweight crypto for IOT, a field of very active research. None of this is controversial to anyone that isn't looking for things to latch negativity onto.
- AlexandrB 9y ago> Keep in mind that IOTA asked the team to attack Curl, not the other way around. This was planned. This seems to contradict the researcher's own post [1]: > We discovered a vulnerability in IOTA after reviewing their code on GitHub in July. We disclosed what we found to the IOTA team on July 14th, and have been in contact with them since then as we discovered new issues and exploits. Finally, even if Curl is meant as a new, lightweight hash function, it was broken by differential cryptanalysis, not some novel, exotic attack vector. Sounds like it needs a lot of work before it's fit for purpose. [1] https://medium.com/@neha/cryptographic-vulnerabilities-in-iota-9a6a9ddc4367 https://medium.com/@neha/cryptographic-vulnerabilities-in-io...
- Aledgerly 9y agoYes, Ethan was then forced to admit that the IOTA team actually approached him in May.
- AlexandrB 9y agoCan you provide a link please? All I see in the comments to the researcher's piece is an IOTA advisor threatening a libel suit - a really good sign that they "really care" about their technical issues.
- Aledgerly 9y agoI highly suggest you read https://blog.iota.org/curl-disclosure-beyond-the-headline-1814048d08ef https://blog.iota.org/curl-disclosure-beyond-the-headline-18...