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> TorMoil, as the flaw has been dubbed by its discoverer, is triggered when users click on links that begin with file:// rather than the more common https:// ht
by mirimir 9y ago
> TorMoil, as the flaw has been dubbed by its discoverer, is triggered when users click on links that begin with file:// rather than the more common https:// https:// and http:// http:// address prefixes. When the Tor browser for macOS and Linux is in the process of opening such an address, "the operating system may directly connect to the remote host, bypassing Tor Browser," according to a brief blog post published Tuesday by We Are Segment, the security firm that privately reported the bug to Tor developers.
Oh, well ... This is basically the same vulnerability exploited by the FBI's NIT. And this is the key aspect ...
> ... "the operating system may directly connect to the remote host, bypassing Tor Browser," ...
Well, in any sort of secure Tor implementation, such a thing should be impossible. The Tor client should be running in a router or gateway VM, and the machine used for browsing should not even have a public IP address. That's easy to manage with Whonix.
I've badgered Tor Project about this for years. And they've ignored me. Their mantra has been about keeping things simple, so more people will use Tor.
Damn.
Edit: They've plugged this leak, but the fundamental weakness remains. Tor Browser doesn't even block non-Tor connectivity with firewall rules. Even VPN clients block non-VPN connectivity.
- Buge 9y agoWhat do you mean the FBI's NIT used basically the same thing? Do you have a source?
- mirimir 9y agoWhat I mean is that it pwns users by bypassing Tor, and reporting their ISP-assigned IP addresses. I'm not arguing that the methods for doing that are similar. [edited for coherence]
- anonymous5133 9y agoAgree completely. If you are running a TOR service/browser you should at least have an option to block all data that wants to move outside of TOR. Imo, the option should be enabled by default. It is better to have a "broken" service rather than risk leaking the real IP. If I recall correctly, wasn't silkroad and alphabay compromised by such a flaw? silkroad leaked the server IP through the captcha and I think something similar for alphabay.
- sillysaurus3 9y agoIf an adversary can achieve network access on your box, they can usually download malware. At that point, it's game over. No firewall rules will protect you. The moment you shut off Tor, you're owned. This is exactly why it's crucial to use Whonix or Tails.
- mirimir 9y agoWell, they can also download malware to when you're using Whonix or Tails. The Whonix workstation VM can not reach the Internet except through its Tor gateway VM. And the gateway VM only accepts connections from the workstation VM to the Tor process. I'm not sure that Tails protects as well against malware. Its emphasis is on leaving no traces on your computer. Being a LiveCD, and wiping RAM during shutdown.
- StavrosK 9y agoDoes anyone know the differences between Whonix/Tails/Qubes? Which one is better?
- Santosh83 9y agoBetter regarding what? Depends on what you want. AFAIK, Whonix is focused on anonymity by using Tor as an integral part of its architecture. TAILS has the same goal but is designed specifically to be run from removable media and to leave no trace on the host system after it's done, much like using a live CD. Qubes is focused on security through isolation by means of an hypervisor. Whonix can run upon Qubes, beside others of course. EDIT: if you want as foolproof of anonymity as possible it seems that Whonix holds an edge over TAILS and both are better than Qubes. Because Whonix routes all network requests through a locked down gateway VM, there is less chance that any program or system component can escape the Tor "funnel" than in TAILS and particularly Qubes, which focuses on security primarily.
- mirimir 9y agoYeah, Whonix on Qubes is the strongest option, I believe.
- yjftsjthsd-h 9y agoI wonder how hard it would be to ship tor as a bundle with qemu and a very thin Linux image that provided just enough functionality to run it, then when you click on the start icon, it opens the emulator, which opens up the browser in a environment that's thin enough you don't even really need to pay attention to it because you've just got a window containing window containing your browser. With the right wm inside, you wouldn't even need that; it just happens that this browser window is actually running inside of the VM that shows up on your physical system.
- mirimir 9y agoThat'd be cool. As long as the network isolation was solid. And easier than getting people to install VBox and Whonix.
- boogiewoogie 9y agoCheck out tails: https://tails.boum.org/about/index.en.html https://tails.boum.org/about/index.en.html Pretty much that. Forward some X11?
- mirimir 9y agoTails isn't a VM. It's a LiveCD.
- raw23 9y agoshameless plug: https://github.com/r-a-w/TorProxy https://github.com/r-a-w/TorProxy This will ensure all outgoing traffic is headed for the Tor network. This would prevent this vuln from being effective as it would drop the outbound packets.
- baby 9y agoThis sounds like the right approach.
- 3pt14159 9y agoIt might be irrational, but I have this vague notion that it's somehow less secure than Tor on a router. Breaking out of virtualization is certainly not easy, but it seems easier than hacking a locked down router.
- mtgx 9y agoWhoa. Whonix has a Windows installer now?! NICE! https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Windows https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Windows
- busterarm 9y agogrugq released this 5 years ago... https://github.com/grugq/portal https://github.com/grugq/portal https://github.com/grugq/PORTALofPi https://github.com/grugq/PORTALofPi
- Bartweiss 9y agoThis looks like the latest in a whole suite of attacks using the same known, preventable channel. At a certain point playing whack-a-mole with the sources of side-channel leaks doesn't make sense anymore; just block those channels outright or admit you're not concerned about IP leakage.
- rsync 9y ago"Well, in any sort of secure Tor implementation, such a thing should be impossible. The Tor client should be running in a router or gateway VM, and the machine used for browsing should not even have a public IP address. That's easy to manage with Whonix." I would go even further and suggest that a mission critical proxy should not live on a system configured with a real (routable) IP address. As we can see in this instance, the OS is too "fussy" and the total implementation is too complex for even an expert in network security to be assured that they will not leak basic network IDs. In my own use of tools like this, not only does the proxying software live on a system whose OS has never seen a real IP but I also throw a "slug" on the network border. "Slug" is the term I use to describe an invisible, layer 2 firewall[1] that blocks ALL network activity except for the addresses/ports of the remote proxy servers. It's sort of like a condom for the network - no matter how weirdly your proxy software breaks, it could only ever talk to the VPN endpoint (and port) anyway ... EDIT: To be clear, an example network design would be: PC --> VPN_box --> slug --> modem ... and in this case, only the modem has a real IP, on the external interface. The VPN_box has non-routable addresses on both sides (and the slug has no IPs). [1] Has no IPs assigned to it - is just an invisible ethernet bridge but is running IP filter rules.
- mirimir 9y agoI like that: "slug" :) Me, I just have a perimeter router.
- lawnchair_larry 9y agoThis is nothing at all like the FBI exploit, which was an RCE vulnerability against firefox. The reason they have been ignoring you about requiring a vm is likely because it is out of scope and doesn't make practical sense. They don't control the parent operating system.
- mirimir 9y agoThis and FBI exploits both relied on apps bypassing Tor. Sure, FBI malware pwned Firefox, and dropped other malware that phoned home. But none of that would have mattered if Tor couldn't be bypassed so easily. Isn't clear by now that reliable "anonymity" systems are impossible without control over the parent OS? Or at least, control over network access?