4 ms·
The vulnerability in question: *The Return of Coppersmith’s Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli∗ https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/p
by tauntz 9y ago
The vulnerability in question: *The Return of Coppersmith’s Attack:
Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli∗ https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/papers/nemec_roca_ccs17_preprint.pdf https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/papers/nemec_roca_ccs...
Estonian ID card uses 2048 byte keys which means generating a private key from a public key takes 140.8 CPU years which is quite fast/trivial/cheap using a distributed approach (botnet, your already existing HW that you use for mining etc).. considering the implications.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/security_flaw_i.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/security_flaw...
- ProblemFactory 9y ago> Estonian ID card uses 2048 byte keys which means generating a private key from a public key takes 140.8 CPU years To clarify, 2048 bit RSA keys are fine. But the smartcard that generates these used a too predictable algorithm for generating the keys.