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There's a big difference between unknowingly fighting over the controls and knowingly fighting over the controls. If Robert had realized that Bonin was making t
by mikeash 9y ago
There's a big difference between unknowingly fighting over the controls and knowingly fighting over the controls. If Robert had realized that Bonin was making the completely wrong control input then maybe he would have put a stop to it somehow. "Stop that, you'll get us all killed" is likely to be effective. He could have told the captain about it as soon as the captain arrived, rather than just before impact. Note that when the incorrect input was finally identified by someone other than Bonin, it was corrected immediately, it was just far too late.
According to the report, ~20 seconds after the events I described above, the plane was still above 30,000ft and recovery was still possible. Yes, the problem developed before this, but it sure looks to me that the bad control design was a major factor in the failure to correct the problem.
- foldr 9y agoThere's no indication that they were fighting unknowingly. I'm not sure what you're concluding that on the basis of. >Note that when the incorrect input was finally identified by someone other than Bonin, it was corrected immediately, it was just far too late. So the popular mechanics article says, but it's not so clear in the report that this ever really happened.
- mannykannot 9y agoIn an earlier reply you wrote "Neither of the pilots in the cockpit ever figured it out" where "it" appears to be that they were fighting over control of the airplane. I realize that this is somewhat unfair, in that your earlier statements are not part of the official report, but what indication would you expect to see that they were fighting unknowingly? There will not necessarily be evidence for it on the voice recorder, and especially in the "unknowingly" phase. The evidence would be in the pilots simultaneously making conflicting control inputs while the airplane was in the dual-control state, and IIRC, the data recorder did show that. Also, according to Langewiesche [1], 'Bonin, using his own priority button, and without saying a word, took control back. This left Robert with a sense that his side-stick had failed. He said, “Fuck, what’s going on?"' - i.e. the nature of the controls introduced additional doubt over what was happening, rather than that it was all a consequence of Bonin's actions (OK, so maybe there is evidence on the CVR.) A similar situation (sustained, pilot-commanded stall) occurred in the AirAsia flight 8501 crash into the Java Sea. While I agree that the nature of the side-stick control was far from being the primary cause of either accident, I am not convinced that it has been ruled out as something of a contributory factor. There is also an entirely different user interface issue here: the stall warnings stopped when Bonin raised the angle of attack beyond a certain point (as the system no longer treated the data as 'plausible') and resumed when he lowered it. [1] https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-...
- foldr 9y ago>"it" appears to be that they were fighting over control of the airplane. "it" was meant to be that the plane was stalled. (My fault for ambiguous phrasing.)
- mikeash 9y agoWhether or not they knew they were fighting is not quite the relevant bit. What's relevant is knowing what the other guy's inputs are. Given that the other two pilots were quite surprised once Bonin finally said that he had been holding the stick back the entire time, they clearly were not aware of this. You say it's not so clear that this ever really happened, but it's pretty clear to me from the official transcript: Robert: remonte remonte remonte remonte Bonin: mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure Captain: non non non ne remonte plus là Robert: alors descends Robert: alors donne moi les commandes à moi les commandes My quick and dirty translation: Robert: climb, climb, climb, climb Bonin: but I've had the stick back all the way this whole time Captain: no, no, no, don't climb anymore Robert: then descend Robert: then give me the controls, I have the controls
- foldr 9y agoBut look at what Robert says before the captain enters: "climb climb climb". He still didn't have a clue that the plane was stalled, even though this could easily have been figured out from the absolutely crazy combination of attitude, throttle setting, and rate of descent. It's the captain who's surprised by the stick being held back, not Robert. In fact, earlier portions of the trascript suggest that Robert was keeping track, more or less, of what the pilot was doing. The captain entered when, according to the report, the plane was at about ~30,000 feet with a 40 degree angle of attack. The report states that "up until the end of the flight, no valid angle of attack value was less than 35°". It seems, then, that even once everyone was aware of what the PF was doing, a correct stall recovery procedure was still not initiated. Or perhaps the stall was already unrecoverable -- I don't know if airliners are designed to recover from such extreme configurations. So, could linked sticks conceivably have helped before the captain entered? Probably not, because there is no evidence that Robert would have recognized that the stick inputs were inapporpriate, given that he was focusing on the ECAM warnings and appeared unable to grasp the implications of the readings from his primary flight instruments. Could linked sticks have helped after the captain entered? At that point, it was just a question of whether either pilot would take control and push the nose down. There's no way of designing the stick system to make sure that most sensible pilot ends up getting control.