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That is an article in popular mechanics that contains a few excerpts from the transcript selected in order to make a particular point. The accident report gives
That is an article in popular mechanics that contains a few excerpts from the transcript selected in order to make a particular point. The accident report gives a detailed description of the behavior of both pilots before the copilot entered (2.1.2.3).
One possible misconception here is that the copilot would have had his hands on the stick. It isn't normal for both pilots to have their hands on the stick. Only the pilot flying does -- for obvious reasons. At the stage where the problem developed, the copilot's attention, as the report explains, was mostly concerned with trying to interpret the ECAM warnings, and later with calling the captain. The idea that the copilot would have closely observed his own (hypothetically linked) stick and detected the problem, despite being fundamentally confused about what was going on, and having many more things on his plate, is little more than wishful thinking. The possibility cannot be conclusively ruled out, but there is no evidence that this would have happened.
I believe this is the official transcript: https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04.pdf https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04...
I see that the first link I posted doesn't contain everything, but I don't see any major omissions either.
At 2:11:37.5, Robert takes control of the plane. According to the report, he pushed the stick to the left twice. Bonin then took back control. Figure 69 on page 96 of the report you linked shows Bonin's pitch inputs during this period. He applies near maximum nose-up pitch right as Robert takes control, and keeps it there. Robert would have felt this had the controls been connected, since he was attempting to control the plane at that time. The report says that Bonin quickly took back control, but the transcript indicates no communication regarding this, which makes it likely they were both attempting to control it for at least a brief period. That figure also indicates that at no time was Bonin's stick ever neutral, so it seems that he never stopped trying to fly the plane even when Robert was nominally in control. Without physical feedback, neither one seems to have realized this. No wonder they were confused about what was going on!
Figure 69 shows Bonin's stick inputs before Robert took control (and a few seconds after). As explained on p. 182 of the report, Robert pressed the override switch at this point and took control, so Bonin's stick inputs would have been ignored. Bonin then took back control by himself pressing the override switch. In effect, then, at this late stage, the pilots were fighting over the stick. If it had been a physical fight via linked control columns, the outcome would most likely have been the same. What can you do if the pilot and co-pilot just don't agree on the correct input, and neither is willing to yield to the other?
For context, all of this is happening at a relatively late stage. Recovery may still have been possible, but the problem developed when the PF was unambiguously in control and the PNF would not have been holding the stick.
There's a big difference between unknowingly fighting over the controls and knowingly fighting over the controls. If Robert had realized that Bonin was making the completely wrong control input then maybe he would have put a stop to it somehow. "Stop that, you'll get us all killed" is likely to be effective. He could have told the captain about it as soon as the captain arrived, rather than just before impact. Note that when the incorrect input was finally identified by someone other than Bonin, it was corrected immediately, it was just far too late.
According to the report, ~20 seconds after the events I described above, the plane was still above 30,000ft and recovery was still possible. Yes, the problem developed before this, but it sure looks to me that the bad control design was a major factor in the failure to correct the problem.
There's no indication that they were fighting unknowingly. I'm not sure what you're concluding that on the basis of.
>Note that when the incorrect input was finally identified by someone other than Bonin, it was corrected immediately, it was just far too late.
So the popular mechanics article says, but it's not so clear in the report that this ever really happened.
In an earlier reply you wrote "Neither of the pilots in the cockpit ever figured it out" where "it" appears to be that they were fighting over control of the airplane.
I realize that this is somewhat unfair, in that your earlier statements are not part of the official report, but what indication would you expect to see that they were fighting unknowingly? There will not necessarily be evidence for it on the voice recorder, and especially in the "unknowingly" phase. The evidence would be in the pilots simultaneously making conflicting control inputs while the airplane was in the dual-control state, and IIRC, the data recorder did show that. Also, according to Langewiesche [1], 'Bonin, using his own priority button, and without saying a word, took control back. This left Robert with a sense that his side-stick had failed. He said, “Fuck, what’s going on?"' - i.e. the nature of the controls introduced additional doubt over what was happening, rather than that it was all a consequence of Bonin's actions (OK, so maybe there is evidence on the CVR.)
A similar situation (sustained, pilot-commanded stall) occurred in the AirAsia flight 8501 crash into the Java Sea.
While I agree that the nature of the side-stick control was far from being the primary cause of either accident, I am not convinced that it has been ruled out as something of a contributory factor.
There is also an entirely different user interface issue here: the stall warnings stopped when Bonin raised the angle of attack beyond a certain point (as the system no longer treated the data as 'plausible') and resumed when he lowered it.
[1] https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-...
Whether or not they knew they were fighting is not quite the relevant bit. What's relevant is knowing what the other guy's inputs are. Given that the other two pilots were quite surprised once Bonin finally said that he had been holding the stick back the entire time, they clearly were not aware of this.
You say it's not so clear that this ever really happened, but it's pretty clear to me from the official transcript:
Robert: remonte remonte remonte remonte
Bonin: mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
Captain: non non non ne remonte plus là
Robert: alors descends
Robert: alors donne moi les commandes à moi les commandes
My quick and dirty translation:
Robert: climb, climb, climb, climb
Bonin: but I've had the stick back all the way this whole time
Captain: no, no, no, don't climb anymore
Robert: then descend
Robert: then give me the controls, I have the controls
But look at what Robert says before the captain enters: "climb climb climb". He still didn't have a clue that the plane was stalled, even though this could easily have been figured out from the absolutely crazy combination of attitude, throttle setting, and rate of descent. It's the captain who's surprised by the stick being held back, not Robert. In fact, earlier portions of the trascript suggest that Robert was keeping track, more or less, of what the pilot was doing.
The captain entered when, according to the report, the plane was at about ~30,000 feet with a 40 degree angle of attack. The report states that "up until the end of the flight, no valid angle of attack value was less than 35°". It seems, then, that even once everyone was aware of what the PF was doing, a correct stall recovery procedure was still not initiated. Or perhaps the stall was already unrecoverable -- I don't know if airliners are designed to recover from such extreme configurations.
So, could linked sticks conceivably have helped before the captain entered? Probably not, because there is no evidence that Robert would have recognized that the stick inputs were inapporpriate, given that he was focusing on the ECAM warnings and appeared unable to grasp the implications of the readings from his primary flight instruments. Could linked sticks have helped after the captain entered? At that point, it was just a question of whether either pilot would take control and push the nose down. There's no way of designing the stick system to make sure that most sensible pilot ends up getting control.
What do you mean, it seems that once everyone was aware of what the PF was doing, a correct recovery procedure was still not initiated? Once they realized what was happening, in the bit of the transcript I quoted, they immediately initiated the correct recovery procedure. It was just much too late by then.
Before that, yes, Robert didn't realize the plane was stalled. But I would bet that this is partially due to having no idea what Bonin's control inputs were. One of the signs of a stall is stick back. If he didn't think the stick was back, he wouldn't think the plane was stalled.
To me it still sounds like physically linked sticks would have been helpful here, if the fundamental problem was that the pilots did not understand the situation. At 11:38, when this first "fighting over the stick" episode happened, Bonin held his stick fully back to the nose-up limit stop, and Robert was not aware of that fact. If the sticks had been linked, he would presumably have noticed it, which might have helped him make sense of the stall warning etc.
I guess it's still a bit of random luck that he actually took the controls for a moment here. Like you say, this was already at a late stage.