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If you're going to go against the conclusions of the accident report, which is very thorough, you'll have to do more than just assert that the side sticks were
by foldr 9y ago
If you're going to go against the conclusions of the accident report, which is very thorough, you'll have to do more than just assert that the side sticks were responsible.
Check it out here: https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp09060...
- dredmorbius 9y agoI have read it. Several times.
- foldr 9y agoGreat, the pages and sections are numbered, so it's easy to refer to the parts of it that support your theory. Or alternatively, you can direct us to whatever conflicting sources of information you believe are more reliable than the official accident report.
- avar 9y agoThis theory isn't citing the report itself, but independent analysis that's been done on the same data. The Wikipedia article on the topic has a whole section for these [1], and a section about this theory in particular [2]. Furthermore. The official accident report for crashes is not always considered the authoritative source for what happened. One good example is EgyptAir Flight 990 which the official report claims is a mechanical failure [3], but which is widely considered to have been pilot suicide. In that case the Egyptian investigative body was thought to be politically motivated. Similarly, it's not at all implausible that the French BEA would be reluctant to make conclusions that could result in the grounding of the entire worldwide Airbus fleet while they're retrofitted with Boeing-style controls while France is the main Airbus manufacturing partner country. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Independent_analyses https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Independ... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Sidestick_control https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Sidestic... 3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990
- foldr 9y agoThe theory is generally sourced from a popular mechanics article. There's nothing particularly authoritative about that "independent analysis". Goodness knows what you mean by the "same data". No third party has access to all the data recovered from the flight recorders and the wreckage. >conclusions that could result in the grounding of the entire worldwide Airbus fleet Concluding that the sidesticks were a contributing factor would not have resulted in the grounding of the fleet. That only happens in the case of extremely severe and extremely immediate threats to safety. UX tweaks would more likely just be included as recommendations. And in fact the report does make some UX recommendations, IIRC.
- avar 9y agoI think PM brought wide attention to it, but it's not like it's just some fringe theory of theirs, see e.g. this CBS report [1] from 2012 (after the PM article was published) with Captain Chesley Sullenberger (of the 2009 Hudson crash fame). Many aviation experts have weighed in on this. Yes they don't have all the data, but they have enough to draw this sort of conclusion, including flight path, status of the plane at any given point, and the cockpit transcripts. And true. Suggesting the fleet would be grounded was hyperbolic on my part. But I stand by my general point. Aside from happened in this accident, you're assuming that anything worthwhile to be learned from a given incident must be covered in the final report, or it must not be worth considering at all. This expects too much of accident investigators, and doesn't account for the sort of institutional blindness that happens when everyone is used to things being done a certain way. Of course that was pilot error, two disconnected joysticks are just how planes are flown! This wasn't the first case of an incident being attributed to Airbus's overdesigned flight controls, QF72 [2]. comes to mind. 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=62&v=kERSSRJant0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=62&v=kERSSRJant0 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72
- foldr 9y agoEvery Airbus crash gives rise to lots of FUD in the media. Initially, everyone was blaming AF447 on the vertical stabilizer breaking off (http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-air-france-447-crash-theory-now-focused-on-tail-snapping-off-again-2009-6?IR=T http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-air-france-447-...). I guess they thought they had "enough" data then, and of course plenty of "experts" were on hand to lend credence to this particular speculation. But anyway, the accident report says what it says. I see no reason to put more trust in random newspaper/magazine articles that just riff on a standard template for covering Airbus accidents (it was the scary computers what dunnit).
- dredmorbius 9y agoYou seem awfully invested in quashing this particular line of argument. Mind my asking why?
- foldr 9y agoI think it's wrong. If you think I am some kind of shill (?), then I guess it makes sense that you would be some kind of conspiracy theorist, given your unwarranted skepticism about the conclusions of the official report.
- dredmorbius 9y agoI made no such accusation. There is considerable informed and expert opinion voiced that the conflicting inputs were a potential issue. A fair bit of that discussed here. There are other instances of conflicted inputs. And despite considering numerous elements of confusion, uncertainty, and information overload, the BEA report doesn't even consider the matter. This calls into question the report itself, the investigation, and the investigators. Such processes are not perfect and may be subject to political pressures (say: EgyptAir Flight 990). I've given the basis on which my skepticism is warrented. You've chosen not to accept it. Cheers.
- foldr 9y agoYou insinuated that I had some kind of ulterior motive, in the same way that you are now insinuating that the accident report was a cover up. As for expert opinion, could you give references? All I can find are articles in the popular press where a journalist emailed someone in the know to confirm that yes, indeed, Airbus control columns are not linked -- which is not a point in dispute. There's a really simple explanation for why the accident report doesn't consider the issue of the control sticks not being linked. It just wasn't a significant factor in the accident, as far as anyone can tell. If you have evidence of a cover up, you should provide it. The fact that the report did not draw the same conclusions that you would have drawn is not evidence of a cover up.
- 9y ago
- dredmorbius 9y agoFirst, I did not say the side-sticks are the fully responsible factor for the accident, but a contributing factor. Second (and as noted in the parallel subthread), the BEA report does not include cockpit transcripts in section 2, 2.1, and relevant subsections, in describing the cockpit situation. It mentions specific utterances of the crew, but not in the specific context and sequence they occurred. Other reports do include these transcripts and from them it's highly probable that multiple inputs were being supplied, or that even if that was not the case it could not be ruled out readily. There are multiple references in the BEA report of the level of confusion and complexity of the situation. The merits of scheduling the Captain's relief in the ITCZ crossing, the flight path itself relative to other aircraft which had diverted around the region, the loss of instrument readings, autopilot disconnects, multiple audio alerts, the disabling of a master alarm that wasn't clearly deliberate, the stated confusion of both co-pilots, the switching to and from "alternate law" of aircraft controls, and more. Adding ambiguity of flight controls, feedback, and possible multiple inputs in the context of all of this again strikes me as, well, a disaster that actually happened. In a description based on the full transcript: 02:11:21 (Robert) On a pourtant les moteurs! Qu'est-ce qui se passe bordel? Je ne comprends pas ce que se passe. We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don't understand what's happening. Unlike the control yokes of a Boeing jetliner, the side sticks on an Airbus are "asynchronous"—that is, they move independently. "If the person in the right seat is pulling back on the joystick, the person in the left seat doesn't feel it," says Dr. David Esser, a professor of aeronautical science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "Their stick doesn't move just because the other one does, unlike the old-fashioned mechanical systems like you find in small planes, where if you turn one, the [other] one turns the same way." Robert has no idea that, despite their conversation about descending, Bonin has continued to pull back on the side stick. http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-hap...
- foldr 9y agoI've addressed the popular mechanics article in other comments. It's difficult to square some of its key claims with the description of events in the accident report. In particular, the report gives no indication that any of the three pilots successfully identified that the plane was stalled. The fundamental issue here is that if only one pilot has his hand on the stick (which should always be true) then linked sticks won't help much, and if both have their hands on the stick (which triggers both audio and visual warnings on the airbus) then they are already fighting over the sticks, indicating a total breakdown of cockpit discipline. The author of the popular mechanics article appears to think that it's normal for both pilots to be holding their sticks at the same time. It's also worth noting that a half-competent PNF could have looked at (i) the pitch attitude, (ii) the throttle setting and (iii) the rate of descent and concluded that the plane was stalled. The fact that the PNF never managed to integrate these three very basic pieces of information makes it seem rather unlikely that he would have paid close attention to the position of his (hypothetically linked) control stick. Note that when the PNF took over the controls briefly, he made a lateral input rather than pushing the stick forward! (p. 183) Finally, sidesticks don't really have "a position". The airbus is usually flown using short movements away from center with the stick then returning to the center.