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>So, basically this was a reprise of the AF 447 crash at sea, where lack of clear command authority combined with a maddeningly poorly-thought-out UI resulted i
by foldr 9y ago
>So, basically this was a reprise of the AF 447 crash at sea, where lack of clear command authority combined with a maddeningly poorly-thought-out UI resulted in a serious accident with loss of life.
I don't want to take this off on a tangent, but this theory of the AF 447 crash keeps getting repeated online despite the fact that the accident report did not conclude that the UI was a factor.
If it's got to the point where the pilots have lost track of who's flying the plane, are ignoring the (audible) "dual control" warning, and are making conflicting control inputs, the plane is probably going to crash anyway. Linking the sticks physically has potential safety downsides in addition to safety upsides (e.g. in the case where one stick gets stuck, or a incapacitated pilot holds it in a particular position).
See e.g. here for further info on sidesticks and safety:
https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/14027/sidestick-safety-concern https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/14027/sidestick...
- dredmorbius 9y agoHearing (one of many) alarms is one thing. Feeling the control wheel or stick fighting you is far more direct. AF 447 was absolutely a UX failure.
- foldr 9y agoIf you're going to go against the conclusions of the accident report, which is very thorough, you'll have to do more than just assert that the side sticks were responsible. Check it out here: https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp09060...
- dredmorbius 9y agoI have read it. Several times.
- foldr 9y agoGreat, the pages and sections are numbered, so it's easy to refer to the parts of it that support your theory. Or alternatively, you can direct us to whatever conflicting sources of information you believe are more reliable than the official accident report.
- avar 9y agoThis theory isn't citing the report itself, but independent analysis that's been done on the same data. The Wikipedia article on the topic has a whole section for these [1], and a section about this theory in particular [2]. Furthermore. The official accident report for crashes is not always considered the authoritative source for what happened. One good example is EgyptAir Flight 990 which the official report claims is a mechanical failure [3], but which is widely considered to have been pilot suicide. In that case the Egyptian investigative body was thought to be politically motivated. Similarly, it's not at all implausible that the French BEA would be reluctant to make conclusions that could result in the grounding of the entire worldwide Airbus fleet while they're retrofitted with Boeing-style controls while France is the main Airbus manufacturing partner country. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Independent_analyses https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Independ... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Sidestick_control https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Sidestic... 3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990
- foldr 9y agoThe theory is generally sourced from a popular mechanics article. There's nothing particularly authoritative about that "independent analysis". Goodness knows what you mean by the "same data". No third party has access to all the data recovered from the flight recorders and the wreckage. >conclusions that could result in the grounding of the entire worldwide Airbus fleet Concluding that the sidesticks were a contributing factor would not have resulted in the grounding of the fleet. That only happens in the case of extremely severe and extremely immediate threats to safety. UX tweaks would more likely just be included as recommendations. And in fact the report does make some UX recommendations, IIRC.
- dredmorbius 9y agoFirst, I did not say the side-sticks are the fully responsible factor for the accident, but a contributing factor. Second (and as noted in the parallel subthread), the BEA report does not include cockpit transcripts in section 2, 2.1, and relevant subsections, in describing the cockpit situation. It mentions specific utterances of the crew, but not in the specific context and sequence they occurred. Other reports do include these transcripts and from them it's highly probable that multiple inputs were being supplied, or that even if that was not the case it could not be ruled out readily. There are multiple references in the BEA report of the level of confusion and complexity of the situation. The merits of scheduling the Captain's relief in the ITCZ crossing, the flight path itself relative to other aircraft which had diverted around the region, the loss of instrument readings, autopilot disconnects, multiple audio alerts, the disabling of a master alarm that wasn't clearly deliberate, the stated confusion of both co-pilots, the switching to and from "alternate law" of aircraft controls, and more. Adding ambiguity of flight controls, feedback, and possible multiple inputs in the context of all of this again strikes me as, well, a disaster that actually happened. In a description based on the full transcript: 02:11:21 (Robert) On a pourtant les moteurs! Qu'est-ce qui se passe bordel? Je ne comprends pas ce que se passe. We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don't understand what's happening. Unlike the control yokes of a Boeing jetliner, the side sticks on an Airbus are "asynchronous"—that is, they move independently. "If the person in the right seat is pulling back on the joystick, the person in the left seat doesn't feel it," says Dr. David Esser, a professor of aeronautical science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "Their stick doesn't move just because the other one does, unlike the old-fashioned mechanical systems like you find in small planes, where if you turn one, the [other] one turns the same way." Robert has no idea that, despite their conversation about descending, Bonin has continued to pull back on the side stick. http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-hap...
- foldr 9y agoI've addressed the popular mechanics article in other comments. It's difficult to square some of its key claims with the description of events in the accident report. In particular, the report gives no indication that any of the three pilots successfully identified that the plane was stalled. The fundamental issue here is that if only one pilot has his hand on the stick (which should always be true) then linked sticks won't help much, and if both have their hands on the stick (which triggers both audio and visual warnings on the airbus) then they are already fighting over the sticks, indicating a total breakdown of cockpit discipline. The author of the popular mechanics article appears to think that it's normal for both pilots to be holding their sticks at the same time. It's also worth noting that a half-competent PNF could have looked at (i) the pitch attitude, (ii) the throttle setting and (iii) the rate of descent and concluded that the plane was stalled. The fact that the PNF never managed to integrate these three very basic pieces of information makes it seem rather unlikely that he would have paid close attention to the position of his (hypothetically linked) control stick. Note that when the PNF took over the controls briefly, he made a lateral input rather than pushing the stick forward! (p. 183) Finally, sidesticks don't really have "a position". The airbus is usually flown using short movements away from center with the stick then returning to the center.
- NoPiece 9y agoI'd call it an interpretation, not a theory. But clearly the conflicting inputs was a UI problem, and while there may be tradeoffs, a better UI could have prevented the AF 447 crash.
- foldr 9y agoThis really won't die. It's clear if you read the accident report (linked in another comment) that the plane was already doomed by the time that conflicting inputs were potentially a factor.
- inferiorhuman 9y agoBasic airmanship could've prevented the crash too. The pilot-in-command got a stall warning and pulled back on the stick, climbing to 38,000 feet. That's not a UI issue, it's a forgetting one of the most fundamental rules of flying issue. https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/1418/what-happens-when-an-airplane-stalls-and-why-do-pilots-practice-it https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/1418/what-happe...
- dredmorbius 9y agoUI issues contribute to situational complexity, stress, ambiguity, and failures to respond appropriately to circumstances. And whilst the BEA report ... rather inexplicably, frankly ... fails to mention the inputs issues, it does address all the other factors I've described here.
- avar 9y agoYou normally can't stall an Airbus aircraft, except in cases where the flight mode changes as it did in this situation. This was a huge part of the problem, an emergency occurred and the pilots were effectively flying an aircraft they hadn't flown before. Fully pulling back the stick is what you'd normally do in an Airbus to gain altitude. It's guaranteed not to stall the plane.
- inferiorhuman 9y ago> Fully pulling back the stick is what you'd normally do in an Airbus to gain altitude. It's guaranteed not to stall the plane. I'd love to see some documentation on "pull back in a stall". In fact, this is all I could find: http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/415373-new-airbus-stall-recovery-procedure.html http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/415373-new-airbus-stall-recov...
- mikeash 9y agoWith linked controls, the sane pilot at the controls would have immediately realized that the crazy one was fighting him, and it would have been brought to a swift end. I know a lot of pilots and I don’t recall ever hearing one express the opinion that non-linked dual controls were anything other than idiotic. I’d personally be quite wary of ever flying such a machine. (Although of course the stuff I fly uses purely mechanical controls so there’s no choice in the matter.)
- foldr 9y agoThe sane pilot realized this anyway. Check the accident report. (Or rather, the captain realized once he entered the cockpit. Neither of the pilots in the cockpit ever figured it out.)
- mikeash 9y agoOnce Bonin told them he had been holding the stick back the entire time, they immediately began a proper recovery, it was just far too late. This might have happened much, much earlier if the other pilot at the controls had been able to feel this.
- foldr 9y agoWhat is your source for this? It does not seem consistent with sections 2.1.3.4-5 of the report. In any case, the captain was not holding a stick when he returned to the cockpit, as both pilots were in their seats. So the captain could not have gotten any tactile feedback regardless of the stick design.
- mikeash 9y agoThis transcript: http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-hap... I’m not talking about the captain, I’m talking about the other pilot at the controls, Robert. He also held the stick back for some time, but he appears to have done this in the mistaken belief that the correct recovery procedure had been tried and failed.
- zkms 9y ago> I don't want to take this off on a tangent, but this theory of the AF 447 crash keeps getting repeated online despite the fact that the accident report did not conclude that the UI was a factor. This is incorrect. The BEA report explicitly blames the lack of an AoA display and recommends that an AoA indicator be directly visible to the pilots. The aircraft already has sensors to measure AoA to feed the flight computers; asking for a direct readout of AoA is nothing beyond a UI change recommendation (and not fundamental aircraft re-engineering): > It is essential in order to ensure flight safety to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of the aeroplane and take the actions that may be required. The AoA invalidation logic ("mark AoA measurements as invalid if airspeed is less than 60kt") made the stall warning turn off as the stall became even deeper, making diagnosis of the stall more complicated. Worse, the BEA report states that the appropriate (nose down) control input led to the stall warning reactivating (since such an input would increase airspeed above the 60kt threshold -- inherent to a proper stall recovery), leading the pilot flying to reverse their control inputs and return the aircraft into a worse stall: > A few seconds after the transition to alternate law, the stall warning sounded briefly, even though the PF’s inputs should have made this warning sound for several seconds. The reason for this is the drop in the measured airspeeds, some of which fell temporarily to below 60 kt, while the angle of attack reached 40°. Furthermore, the drop in measured airspeeds to values of less than 60 kt during the stall caused the repeated activation and deactivation of the warning which may have made it considerably more difficult for the Captain to effectively analyse the situation on his return to the cockpit. > Several nose-down inputs caused a drop in the pitch attitude and the angle of attack, whose values then became valid, such that a clear nose-down input resulted in the triggering of the stall warning. It appears that the PF reacted, on at least two occasions, with a nose-up input, whose consequences were an increase in angle of attack, a drop in measured speed and consequently stopping the stall warning. Lacking an AoA readout, the pilots would have had to reverse-engineer AoA from their extant instrument displays, the warnings they were presented, the "feel" of the airplane (is it buffeting? how is it responding to various control inputs?, etc), and past control inputs. Every one of those sources were degraded per the BEA report: they didn't trust (to the point of changing the selected inertial data source even if there was no indicated issue with inertial data) their instruments because of the airspeed inconsistency, the stall warning would reactivate every time they made the correct control input (the exact opposite behaviour of a stall warning simply based on an AoA threshold), and buffet might have been interpreted as overspeed buffet. Expecting pilots to reverse-engineer the aircraft's warnings to guesstimate AoA -- a value that the machinery simultaneously measures and hides from the pilots -- is fatally bad UI (BEA uses the fancier term "ergonomics"), especially in cases when the flight computers deal with air data inconsistencies by forking over more authority to the pilots.