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I would honestly be more worried about the root CAs which are enabled by default in the most popular OSes and browsers, with root CA privileges for government o
by walrus01 9y ago
I would honestly be more worried about the root CAs which are enabled by default in the most popular OSes and browsers, with root CA privileges for government of China controlled entities, Turkish government entities and unethical/shoddy root CAs such as Symantec. The Netherlands recently passed a law allowing the government specifically to use false keys and run MITM on crypto, which brings into question all .NL based CAs.
- rvanmil 9y agoDo you have a reference to this law in The Netherlands?
- PhantomGremlin 9y agoPosted to HN a few days ago. Didn't get a lot of discussion. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15595928 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15595928
- rocqua 9y agoThere is an upcomming advisory (i.e. non-binding) referendum about this law coming up. Specifically, the referendum is about reversing the law. Notably, some parties in the newly minted government have declared their intention to ignore the referendum. They back this by two arguments "It is needed for security" and "We are going to remove the advisory referendum anyway, so we get to ignore this one". That second point is kind of interesting, because the referendum is possible due to a rather new law. We had one before that went rather poorly, so now we want to get rid of it. The actual law is here [1] this site [2] advocates for the referendum. I'm afraid I don't know of any english sources. Quoting from the law, and applying my own translation >> Article 45. Member 1 The services are authorized to: a. (Basically, do exploratory searches of networks) b. Use false signals, false keys, false identity or intervention by third parties to gain acces to automated systems. This can be done with the help of technical tooling. Article 45. Member 2 The authorization from member 1b above also authorizes: a. The defeating of any security measures b. Installing technical measures to reverse encryption on data stored or processed by automated systems. c. (references article 40) d. To copy data stored or processed by an automated system. Article 45 Member 2 (summarized, the government needs to give written permission for any of the above to happen) >> This seems to be the referenced passage based on a preliminary search. [1] https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34588-A.html https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34588-A.html [2]https://sleepwet.nl/ https://sleepwet.nl/
- rvanmil 9y agoThanks, I did not realize the “sleepwet” also authorized defeating encryption.
- jopsen 9y agoHopefully the certificate transparency effort will cleanup some of this misuse.
- Ajedi32 9y agoThose CAs are at least accountable to browser vendors. (Symantec, for example, is currently in the process of having their root certs distrusted by Chrome and Firefox as a result of their violations of the BRs.) The same can't be said of private root certs like this.
- uxp 9y agoA good question to be asked might be why we are still conflating the certificate store used for software signing with the certificate store for domain validation. They're two entirely different problem domains using the same tool. Much like it doesn't make sense to use a drywall screw to join eyeglass frames together despite both attachment mechanisms requiring screws, it doesn't make sense to allow a system to validate a web domain as being trustworthy because an audio driver requires a certificate trust to validate itself as being legitimate. Most of this separation is done on good-faith already, but it should be done in a more discrete manner.