There are so many problems with this piece, I hardly know where to begin. Kerckhoff's Principle states that a system is secure if and only if the security arch

There are so many problems with this piece, I hardly know where to begin. Kerckhoff's Principle states that a system is secure if and only if the security architecture (as in, not the keys) is publicly available and non-key-holding attackers are literally unable to successfully attack the system in spite of their knowledge of the security architecture. Battlefield examples are horrible counter-examples. To take an extreme example, if I drop a nuke on an enemy soldier, he's going to die. If I drop a nuke on a tank, it's going to vaporize. There is literally no amount of armor in the world that can create an unattackable battlefield-security architecture, which is the whole reason why militaries rely on camouflage. The use of camouflage is a tacit admission that "yes, in the real world, something could successfully attack us, so we need to rely on other measures." Modern security engineers don't mindlessly spend time and money to "improve their security posture" without an appreciation for the consequences thereof. They understand that the A in CIA stands for Availability, and that not using the default ports hurts legitimate users expecting the default and confused by the lack thereof far more than it foils attackers. They understand that security engineering is about raising the cost of mounting an attack to be more expensive than the value of the target, and worry about the cost of new security measures versus the benefit of those new security measures (because it now costs $X > $old to successfully attack the target) versus the expected resources of an attacker (by running detailed risk and threat analyses to identify potential adversaries and estimating their capabilities). If it costs $X to attack a target which is worth $Y < $X and your adversaries only have $Z < $Y < $X to attack then spending $any to further "improve your security posture" is not just irrational and indefensible but ultimately destructive to the target itself which you are supposed to be protecting, because those resources could be spent more productively elsewhere to the benefit of the target. Which brings me to the presidential convoy example. Which vehicle the president is in is not a secret key in the president's security architecture, because knowing which car the president is in does not easily and magically give you access to the president. The point of having the additional obfuscation of additional vehicles is about raising the cost of a successful attack. Let's say the attacker's "nuke" is a shoulder-mounted anti-tank missile which will successfully destroy the target. If there's only one vehicle, then the attacker only needs one missile. But if the convoy has three vehicles, then a successful attack will cost more than three times as much - not just the cost of the additional missiles, but also the cost of finding additional trustworthy people to carry the additional missiles and carry out the attack, plus the cost of training and coordinating the attackers to work in concert and successfully carry out the attack, plus the additional risk of the plans accidentally leaking due to additional people being involved in the planning and execution of the attack. Changing from port 22 to port 24 does absolutely nothing to raise the cost for anyone but the opportunistic script kiddie hacker who is paying virtually $0 to add your public IP's to a list of targets. Dedicated internal threats will be aware of the port change and dedicated external threats will become aware of the change when they swipe an unencrypted employee laptop or phish a common password, and you will not be able to change the ports on all your servers from 24 to something else without inflicting massive pain on every legitimate user whose machines are configured to expect 24 but suddenly won't successfully connect anymore.