In the context of Hegel's dialectic, my understanding is that "undesirable" would be the synthesis of "bad" and "something that tempers the badness," which coul

In the context of Hegel's dialectic, my understanding is that "undesirable" would be the synthesis of "bad" and "something that tempers the badness," which could simply be "low intensity." Said another way, I don't think your question is all that valid, it's like asking "Why is something pink, if it is not red?" Which if you ask me sounds like a pondering from a pre-Socratic also-ran, and at any rate the question can be dispensed by saying that pink is a less intense red. All in all, they're all value judgments, so the good-faith answer is: like all value-judgements, it's because the perceiver says so. I’m interested in digging at the normatives. Assuming this isn't to indicate a search for consensus where there isn't any, the "normative" is that someone donating $1 can't make these demands, so maybe a better question would be why do rich people demand namings, and could it be merely a personality flaw to force people to use their name to refer to something oriented around their donation (building, fund, etc.)? That is, rather than right or wrong, can we ask whether it's selfish? Immature? Something else? Fire up your dialectic if you like. How ridiculous would it be to create "The Barney Google Fund for Helping People Reach a State of Getting Things Named After Themselves?" I'd say if you think, "say, that's not a bad idea!" then you probably don't see a problem with donations purchasing naming rights. Plain and simple, no dialectic necessary. But we can come up with reasons not to do something all day. So, assuming for simplicity that naming is optional and the money would be given regardless, in what ways are named donations a good thing? I find this approach more readily exposes the details.