> Also, as they say in this post, Google is already developing an even stronger isolation model that would have prevented this type of attack. It's just not ful

> Also, as they say in this post, Google is already developing an even stronger isolation model that would have prevented this type of attack. It's just not fully tested and enabled yet. Note that Site Isolation has to run every origin in a separate process to be maximally effective, which nobody has demonstrated a feasible way to do at scale yet. The plan as I understand it is to run just "high-value sites" in separate processes. > It's also why I was hoping Mozilla wouldn't make those "best of both worlds" compromises between sandboxing and saving 30% memory. Is saving 30% memory worth having your browser twice as exploitable? Maybe it won't be that exploitable, so we'll see. Firefox may also be able to make up for the weaker sandboxing with the Rust rewrites, but only time will tell. Where did you get the idea that Firefox is not committed to strong sandboxing?