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Which was a criticism of lavabit's advertising of "so secure that even our administrators can’t read your e-mail." https://moxie.org/blog/lavabit-critique/ htt
by astura 9y ago
Which was a criticism of lavabit's advertising of "so secure that even our administrators can’t read your e-mail."
https://moxie.org/blog/lavabit-critique/ https://moxie.org/blog/lavabit-critique/
Unlike the design of most secure servers, which are ciphertext in and ciphertext out, this is the inverse: plaintext in and plaintext out. The server stores your password for authentication, uses that same password for an encryption key, and promises not to look at either the incoming plaintext, the password itself, or the outgoing plaintext.
The ciphertext, key, and password are all stored on the server using a mechanism that is solely within the server’s control and which the client has no ability to verify. There is no way to ever prove or disprove whether any encryption was ever happening at all, and whether it was or not makes little difference.
... The operator can at any time stop averting their eyes, an attacker who compromises the server can log the password a user transmits, and an attacker who can intercept communication to the server can obtain the password as well as the plaintext email...The cryptography was nothing more than a lot of overhead and some shorthand for a promise not to peek. Even though they advertised that they “can’t” read your email, what they meant was that they would choose not to.