4 ms·
Not much you can do other than fight a war of escalation. If you want to give the phisher lots to do, create say 10 versions of your site where the html/css/js
by tyingq 9y ago
Not much you can do other than fight a war of escalation.
If you want to give the phisher lots to do, create say 10 versions of your site where the html/css/js are tightly intertwined. Such that html version "a" only works with css/versiona.css and js/versionb.js. Mismatches create a site you can't view, interact with etc.
Then, for each version, put your countermeasures in your main js and css files, and tweak your site so that it doesn't work at all without those main js and css files. Add subresource integrity to the each version of the main html that pulls them in. Obfuscate each version of js and css.
And vary up the countermeasures per version. Like displaying the bitcoin address with css (selector:after {content: 'abc'}, with an image, dynamically with obfuscated javascript, etc).
Round robin which version of the page is served. This will make caching anything hard for the phisher, and the variations of countermeasures might get them to find a softer target.
Shitload of work, though, just because some ahole wants to skim money.
- grubles 9y agoJavascript is disabled out of the box in Tor Browser if I remember correctly. At least it should be.
- tyingq 9y agoNope.. https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBJavaScriptEnabled https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBJavaScriptEna...
- meowface 9y agoIf they just reverse proxy the site (and strip or change subresource integrity tags), how would any of this actually help? I don't think there's really a way to prevent someone from creating a phishing version of your website. You can get alerted to it by checking your web server access logs, but beyond that you can probably only take legal measures.
- tyingq 9y agoThe proxy is altering the JavaScript, css, and HTML to get rid of various countermeasures. Maybe one version dynamically pulls in crucial js with subresource integrity, with obfuscated text that isn't as simple to strip out. Another version where the main obfuscated js bombs if the subresource integrity has been stripped from the HTML, etc. The approach I described means they need to solve for X different variations of different types of countermeasures. Think things like obfuscated JS that checks location.host, or the Bitcoin address. And responds in different ways. Buried in the main js. But each variation of the site using slightly different countermeasures, div ids, ways to encode the text of the bitcoin address, etc. Like copy protection. Yes, you can break it. But time and effort are expended. The article already suggests some laziness from the scraper. He only substituted the hostname if it was lower case. The general idea here is lots of countermeasures, and ones that change with every request. Wearing them down. >You can get alerted to it by checking your web server access logs Maybe. Hard on tor, there may be nothing unique about the requests.