I'm going to give an analogy in response to your EDIT AGAIN. I claim that it's morally indefensible to torture a fish. Even if thousands of humans are to die u

I'm going to give an analogy in response to your EDIT AGAIN. I claim that it's morally indefensible to torture a fish. Even if thousands of humans are to die unless I torture this fish (for some reason), you must refuse. It's torture. To advocate otherwise is to normalise torture, and to go against every moral decision societies have ever made. (Let's ignore the fact that factory farms exist, a moral abhorrence on a gigantic scale if you care about the welfare of animals; whether or not that abhorrence is balanced by an even greater moral benefit from the wide-scale eating of meat they enable. To be clear, I'm explicitly not giving an opinion on whether factory farms are a net benefit; to discuss that aspect further would be to miss the point of the argument entirely.) If I took your moral system and also assigned worth to the well-being of fish, it's quite possible that I could end up with that. But I hope you agree that the views of my second paragraph are at best ridiculous, and at worst abhorrent. So something must be wrong either with the generalisation of your argument, or with the assumption that the well-being of fish is worth defending. So either caring even a little about the well-being of fish makes me a moral vacuum, or some part of your argument doesn't generalise away from "torture of humans". Do you at least see that your argument doesn't have overwhelming force? I'd hope that a worthy moral framework would generalise more easily than this facet of yours that you've presented.