8 ms·

This is confusing and concerning to me as a potential customer. Having used CrashPlan and other proprietary and FOSS backup software, I don't understand this d

This is confusing and concerning to me as a potential customer. Having used CrashPlan and other proprietary and FOSS backup software, I don't understand this description of how restoration works with Backblaze. 1. Why is the data being decrypted server-side instead of client-side? The server should be sending the encrypted data to the client, and the password should never leave the client machine. 2. Why are zip files being created? The client software should be receiving the data and writing the files directly to the selected restore directory. e.g. this is how restore works with CrashPlan, and it only takes a few seconds to begin the process. Files are written directly to the selected output directory.

brianwski 9y ago
I'll answer these in reverse order: > 2. Why are zip files being created? We actually offer two forms of restore: A) Zip File Download, and B) External USB Hard Drive FedEx'ed to your home. In the case of the Zip file download, we chose the format of zip because both Mac and PC (the most common desktops) natively understand it with no additional software needed. In other words, if you just lost your computer, go to ANY COMPUTER ANYWHERE and you can fetch your files with a web browser. Zip preserves the file hierarchy and the last modified time, so it's "pretty good". In the case of the USB Hard Drive there is no zip file, we can correctly place each file with all the correct timestamps in the correct heirarchy on the USB Hard Drive (which is actually an encrypted hard drive) and then FedEx the hard drive to you anywhere in the world in a day or two. > 1. Why is the data being decrypted server-side instead of client-side? Short Answer: Ease of use. Longer Answer: To clarify, Backblaze produces four different products/modes for different customers with different needs and requirements. We want customers to choose what is appropriate for them. One size does not fit all: 1) Online Backup ($5/month) where every file is encrypted on your laptop BEFORE being sent to Backblaze and your backup is secured by your username/password - where you can recover your password if you have access to your email account. (We support two-factor auth which provides an additional optional layer of protection.) 2) Online Backup ($5/month) where every file is encrypted on your laptop BEFORE being sent to Backblaze and your backup is secured by your username/password AND your private encryption key is secured by a "passphrase" that is not recoverable in any way, shape, or form. (Two-factor auth is also optional here.) 3) B2 Object storage (half of 1 cent/GByte/month) where you store your file completely unencrypted, and this can be "private" (only accessible by username/password) or "totally public accessible by knowing the URL". A good application of this is serving up a web page to the public - you really WANT people to see all the contents! 4) B2 Object storage (half of 1 cent/GByte/month) where Backblaze has zero knowledge. You cannot browse your file hierarchy because Backblaze doesn't know your filenames. You cannot preview your images. You cannot recover your passwords. There is no other option other than downloading the encrypted blobs and applying whatever decryption algorithm you decided on (we have no ability to know what that is). Ok, so I think some (many?) people in the security field think that Backblaze should ONLY offer mode #4 (and maybe #3 to serve up public websites). I happen to disagree and I personally feel that products #1 and #2 are useful and appropriate for some customers. But everybody is welcome to their opinion and we want to be completely open as to what exactly is occurring and what we are offering as a service. Personally I think #2 is an excellent trade off of security vs convenience. Your data is as impervious to attack as a zero knowledge system in #4 for years upon years. Then one day your laptop is stolen or crashes and you want your files back. You want all 4 TBytes back - so you order one of our free (encrypted) USB hard drives to be FedEx'ed to your home with all your data. To kick this process off FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER you tell us your passphrase (up until this very moment it really has been zero knowledge). At this moment you are opening a window of SLIGHTLY lowered security that slams shut after a few hours. For those few hours of preparing your 4 TByte restore, if an undetected hacker had compromised the one restore server in the Backblaze data center that your job was on, that hacker could possibly get access to your files. But then the reduced security window slams shut, we NEVER write your passphrase to any disk so it has now vaporized and we do not remember it, and if a hacker hacks into our system the following day you are STILL completely impervious. But again, as long as you fully understand the implications of #3 I am COMPLETELY supportive if you instead choose #4 which is our "Zero Knowledge" offering.
- philsnow 9y ago
  > At this moment you are opening a window of SLIGHTLY lowered security that slams shut after a few hours. For those few hours of preparing your 4 TByte restore, if an undetected hacker had compromised the one restore server in the Backblaze data center that your job was on, that hacker could possibly get access to your files. But then the reduced security window slams shut, we NEVER write your passphrase to any disk so it has now vaporized and we do not remember it, and if a hacker hacks into our system the following day you are STILL completely impervious. This is the part that security people get hung up on. We have to trust Backblaze [0] to not hang onto the password longer than you say you will, either intentionally (say, "to improve the user experience") or unintentionally ("oh that memory got written to swap and happened to persist on disk for a long time, whoops"). So that's the "malicious" case (maybe some of the above described cases are "benign malice", doesn't matter). There's also the "subverted" case: if the decryption password enters your infrastructure, we have to trust that you have not been popped by an attacker. Whereas, if Backblaze has zero knowledge, and only serves encrypted bits, the _only_ concerns customers have are with durability and availability, which it sounds like you have pretty well in hand from your description of how bits are distributed around your datacenter(s). [0] not just Backblaze but 5-years-from-now Backblaze: people and businesses change.
  - Spooky23 9y ago
    If you really care about the security of your data at this level (or external factors force you to care!), you shouldn't be using a product like BackBlaze. In a commercial setting, you need to control the infrastructure and security artifacts. Otherwise, old fashioned physical controls are effective, trustworthy and have more legal protections than any of these products at a cost of some convenience.
- elfchief 9y ago
  I would really like #2 to have the option of sending encrypted files on disk or zip, and y'all providing a client that will decrypt them using my passphrase, locally. Nothing personal, but I really don't want y'all seeing my data, even if I need to restore. (context: I've been a Backblaze user for years and love the hell out of you. I've never really thought of how the restore would work with my encrypted data, though. Turns out the story is ... not what I had hoped)

brianwski 9y ago

I'll answer these in reverse order: > 2. Why are zip files being created? We actually offer two forms of restore: A) Zip File Download, and B) External USB Hard Drive FedEx'ed to your home. In the case of the Zip file download, we chose the format of zip because both Mac and PC (the most common desktops) natively understand it with no additional software needed. In other words, if you just lost your computer, go to ANY COMPUTER ANYWHERE and you can fetch your files with a web browser. Zip preserves the file hierarchy and the last modified time, so it's "pretty good". In the case of the USB Hard Drive there is no zip file, we can correctly place each file with all the correct timestamps in the correct heirarchy on the USB Hard Drive (which is actually an encrypted hard drive) and then FedEx the hard drive to you anywhere in the world in a day or two. > 1. Why is the data being decrypted server-side instead of client-side? Short Answer: Ease of use. Longer Answer: To clarify, Backblaze produces four different products/modes for different customers with different needs and requirements. We want customers to choose what is appropriate for them. One size does not fit all: 1) Online Backup ($5/month) where every file is encrypted on your laptop BEFORE being sent to Backblaze and your backup is secured by your username/password - where you can recover your password if you have access to your email account. (We support two-factor auth which provides an additional optional layer of protection.) 2) Online Backup ($5/month) where every file is encrypted on your laptop BEFORE being sent to Backblaze and your backup is secured by your username/password AND your private encryption key is secured by a "passphrase" that is not recoverable in any way, shape, or form. (Two-factor auth is also optional here.) 3) B2 Object storage (half of 1 cent/GByte/month) where you store your file completely unencrypted, and this can be "private" (only accessible by username/password) or "totally public accessible by knowing the URL". A good application of this is serving up a web page to the public - you really WANT people to see all the contents! 4) B2 Object storage (half of 1 cent/GByte/month) where Backblaze has zero knowledge. You cannot browse your file hierarchy because Backblaze doesn't know your filenames. You cannot preview your images. You cannot recover your passwords. There is no other option other than downloading the encrypted blobs and applying whatever decryption algorithm you decided on (we have no ability to know what that is). Ok, so I think some (many?) people in the security field think that Backblaze should ONLY offer mode #4 (and maybe #3 to serve up public websites). I happen to disagree and I personally feel that products #1 and #2 are useful and appropriate for some customers. But everybody is welcome to their opinion and we want to be completely open as to what exactly is occurring and what we are offering as a service. Personally I think #2 is an excellent trade off of security vs convenience. Your data is as impervious to attack as a zero knowledge system in #4 for years upon years. Then one day your laptop is stolen or crashes and you want your files back. You want all 4 TBytes back - so you order one of our free (encrypted) USB hard drives to be FedEx'ed to your home with all your data. To kick this process off FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER you tell us your passphrase (up until this very moment it really has been zero knowledge). At this moment you are opening a window of SLIGHTLY lowered security that slams shut after a few hours. For those few hours of preparing your 4 TByte restore, if an undetected hacker had compromised the one restore server in the Backblaze data center that your job was on, that hacker could possibly get access to your files. But then the reduced security window slams shut, we NEVER write your passphrase to any disk so it has now vaporized and we do not remember it, and if a hacker hacks into our system the following day you are STILL completely impervious. But again, as long as you fully understand the implications of #3 I am COMPLETELY supportive if you instead choose #4 which is our "Zero Knowledge" offering.

philsnow 9y ago
> At this moment you are opening a window of SLIGHTLY lowered security that slams shut after a few hours. For those few hours of preparing your 4 TByte restore, if an undetected hacker had compromised the one restore server in the Backblaze data center that your job was on, that hacker could possibly get access to your files. But then the reduced security window slams shut, we NEVER write your passphrase to any disk so it has now vaporized and we do not remember it, and if a hacker hacks into our system the following day you are STILL completely impervious. This is the part that security people get hung up on. We have to trust Backblaze [0] to not hang onto the password longer than you say you will, either intentionally (say, "to improve the user experience") or unintentionally ("oh that memory got written to swap and happened to persist on disk for a long time, whoops"). So that's the "malicious" case (maybe some of the above described cases are "benign malice", doesn't matter). There's also the "subverted" case: if the decryption password enters your infrastructure, we have to trust that you have not been popped by an attacker. Whereas, if Backblaze has zero knowledge, and only serves encrypted bits, the _only_ concerns customers have are with durability and availability, which it sounds like you have pretty well in hand from your description of how bits are distributed around your datacenter(s). [0] not just Backblaze but 5-years-from-now Backblaze: people and businesses change.
- Spooky23 9y ago
  If you really care about the security of your data at this level (or external factors force you to care!), you shouldn't be using a product like BackBlaze. In a commercial setting, you need to control the infrastructure and security artifacts. Otherwise, old fashioned physical controls are effective, trustworthy and have more legal protections than any of these products at a cost of some convenience.
elfchief 9y ago
I would really like #2 to have the option of sending encrypted files on disk or zip, and y'all providing a client that will decrypt them using my passphrase, locally. Nothing personal, but I really don't want y'all seeing my data, even if I need to restore. (context: I've been a Backblaze user for years and love the hell out of you. I've never really thought of how the restore would work with my encrypted data, though. Turns out the story is ... not what I had hoped)