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> How can you both agree that a clear line doesn't exist, while in the same sentence saying "obviously wrong"? Same way as I can say something is obviously a h

> How can you both agree that a clear line doesn't exist, while in the same sentence saying "obviously wrong"? Same way as I can say something is obviously a heap of sand without pointing out exactly at which point it turned into one from it's beginnings as some grains of sand (Sorites paradox) Regarding moral relativism, I don't buy it, but that's not something we can argue about in an HN thread... You are right that pure moral arguments don't change anything, but I don't think the reason is that people don't share morals, but rather have to do with people being extremely good at rationalizing away the immorality, or never questioning it in the first place. Of course, if you think ethics is a relative concept then this reply won't convince you but the argument that might convince you would not fit this format.

white-flame 9y ago
> Same way as I can say something is obviously a heap of sand without pointing out exactly at which point it turned into one from it's beginnings as some grains of sand (Sorites paradox) But that's not the situation here. You're saying that there is some scale at which something is "obviously wrong" implying a convergent consensus of observance. Tying it to sorites, it would be like you claiming that there's a fuzziness beyond which the heap should be considered "obviously too big" by everyone, while to others there's no such concept as a heap that's too big (or even merely disagree that you've entered "too big" territory yet). You can't argue that it's too big, without pulling in something external that they might share. > Regarding moral relativism, I don't buy it It's not that morals are "relative", and I agree that's a terrible label, but more that morals are held as axiomatic. There is no and cannot be justification of morals themselves, they simply are held (or are not held) by a person as the foundational root clauses from which all their other justifications are derived. So there's no possible way to argue or justify root morals to others who simply don't share them. You'd need to link them to morals that the other does hold for there to be any worthwhile concept conveyed at all. Otherwise it's just yelling that others are not following your particular flying spaghetti monster. If one fundamentally believes that animal suffering matters, and another fundamentally believes that it does not, what possible justification or persuasion would cross that boundary? > You are right that pure moral arguments don't change anything, but I don't think the reason is that people don't share morals, but rather have to do with people being extremely good at rationalizing away the immorality, or never questioning it in the first place. Re-read what you said, and consider it in the initial discussion of animal rights. You're saying that there is a morality held in a person that is invoked in an observed situation that is being rationalized away, implying that they fundamentally subscribe to the same morals as you. I think this convergence (and I'd simply call it a projection) is an extreme claim, going against the observed variety among cultures & schools of thought around the world and throughout history. That's simply not an accurate picture of humanity. In particular, sensitivity and callousness to specific situations of harm are very trained, and degrees of harm in varied directions exist in absolutely everything, all the way down to entropy. Just look at governmental overreach to see how the concept of "harm" can be all encompassing, bringing a justification for involvement wherever they may choose, from economics to surveillance.
- placebo 9y ago
  > You're saying that there is a morality held in a person that is invoked in an observed situation that is being rationalized away, implying that they fundamentally subscribe to the same morals as you No, I'm saying something even more extreme. I'm saying that ultimately, morality does not depend on any point of view (mine or anyone else's) in much the same way that what is ultimately true doesn't depend on any point of view. Immorality is simply ignorance doing its thing. I'm in no way free of ignorance, but I am actively trying to reduce it. > I think this convergence (and I'd simply call it a projection) is an extreme claim, going against the observed variety among cultures & schools of thought around the world and throughout history. That's simply not an accurate picture of humanity. Yes, there is an incredible and fascinating variety in humanity. Situations, points of view, emotions, agendas - all can be extremely complex and nuanced and very dependent on conditioning or "starting conditions". Yet, I think you'll find that compassion is something that is understood in any culture (as is fear), and the ability to empathize with someone else's situation (be it in another culture or another species) is not as far fetched as you make it seem. You've obviously given some thought to your claims (which these days is refreshing), and as someone who always wants to get to the truth of things, I'll gladly give up everything I believe in if it is incorrect, but then again my understanding wasn't acquired overnight, so if you're also as keen to dig deeper and see what comes up I'll be happy to correspond further.
  - white-flame 9y ago
    I don't know if you'll read this as it's been a while, but you're just repeating what I said. Your morals are axiomatic, and as ground truth they can't be supported by anything other than their supposed self-apparentness. Your second half simply restates my "sensitivity and callousness to specific situations of harm are very trained", as that's all we're talking about here: How various harm "feels" when you see them carried out. This empathizing you base things on is hugely selective even within you. You aren't empathizing with the plight of plants or insects, for instance. If you empathized with everything equally, then you'd be crippled by any amount of perceived harm, which is pervasive. Everybody is empathetic & compassionate, but to different situations. This has a ton to do with culture and normality. People constantly misconstrue their sensitivities with morals.

white-flame 9y ago

> Same way as I can say something is obviously a heap of sand without pointing out exactly at which point it turned into one from it's beginnings as some grains of sand (Sorites paradox) But that's not the situation here. You're saying that there is some scale at which something is "obviously wrong" implying a convergent consensus of observance. Tying it to sorites, it would be like you claiming that there's a fuzziness beyond which the heap should be considered "obviously too big" by everyone, while to others there's no such concept as a heap that's too big (or even merely disagree that you've entered "too big" territory yet). You can't argue that it's too big, without pulling in something external that they might share. > Regarding moral relativism, I don't buy it It's not that morals are "relative", and I agree that's a terrible label, but more that morals are held as axiomatic. There is no and cannot be justification of morals themselves, they simply are held (or are not held) by a person as the foundational root clauses from which all their other justifications are derived. So there's no possible way to argue or justify root morals to others who simply don't share them. You'd need to link them to morals that the other does hold for there to be any worthwhile concept conveyed at all. Otherwise it's just yelling that others are not following your particular flying spaghetti monster. If one fundamentally believes that animal suffering matters, and another fundamentally believes that it does not, what possible justification or persuasion would cross that boundary? > You are right that pure moral arguments don't change anything, but I don't think the reason is that people don't share morals, but rather have to do with people being extremely good at rationalizing away the immorality, or never questioning it in the first place. Re-read what you said, and consider it in the initial discussion of animal rights. You're saying that there is a morality held in a person that is invoked in an observed situation that is being rationalized away, implying that they fundamentally subscribe to the same morals as you. I think this convergence (and I'd simply call it a projection) is an extreme claim, going against the observed variety among cultures & schools of thought around the world and throughout history. That's simply not an accurate picture of humanity. In particular, sensitivity and callousness to specific situations of harm are very trained, and degrees of harm in varied directions exist in absolutely everything, all the way down to entropy. Just look at governmental overreach to see how the concept of "harm" can be all encompassing, bringing a justification for involvement wherever they may choose, from economics to surveillance.

placebo 9y ago
> You're saying that there is a morality held in a person that is invoked in an observed situation that is being rationalized away, implying that they fundamentally subscribe to the same morals as you No, I'm saying something even more extreme. I'm saying that ultimately, morality does not depend on any point of view (mine or anyone else's) in much the same way that what is ultimately true doesn't depend on any point of view. Immorality is simply ignorance doing its thing. I'm in no way free of ignorance, but I am actively trying to reduce it. > I think this convergence (and I'd simply call it a projection) is an extreme claim, going against the observed variety among cultures & schools of thought around the world and throughout history. That's simply not an accurate picture of humanity. Yes, there is an incredible and fascinating variety in humanity. Situations, points of view, emotions, agendas - all can be extremely complex and nuanced and very dependent on conditioning or "starting conditions". Yet, I think you'll find that compassion is something that is understood in any culture (as is fear), and the ability to empathize with someone else's situation (be it in another culture or another species) is not as far fetched as you make it seem. You've obviously given some thought to your claims (which these days is refreshing), and as someone who always wants to get to the truth of things, I'll gladly give up everything I believe in if it is incorrect, but then again my understanding wasn't acquired overnight, so if you're also as keen to dig deeper and see what comes up I'll be happy to correspond further.
- white-flame 9y ago
  I don't know if you'll read this as it's been a while, but you're just repeating what I said. Your morals are axiomatic, and as ground truth they can't be supported by anything other than their supposed self-apparentness. Your second half simply restates my "sensitivity and callousness to specific situations of harm are very trained", as that's all we're talking about here: How various harm "feels" when you see them carried out. This empathizing you base things on is hugely selective even within you. You aren't empathizing with the plight of plants or insects, for instance. If you empathized with everything equally, then you'd be crippled by any amount of perceived harm, which is pervasive. Everybody is empathetic & compassionate, but to different situations. This has a ton to do with culture and normality. People constantly misconstrue their sensitivities with morals.