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This is silly. The author points out the problem of making short-term evaluations of a long-term strategy and yet he never actually says that. Also, his hypothe
by phkahler 9y ago
This is silly. The author points out the problem of making short-term evaluations of a long-term strategy and yet he never actually says that. Also, his hypothetical omniscient "god" can see 10 years into the future but doesn't allow himself to rebalance the portfolio more often than 5 year intervals. I'm not sure what point he's trying to make or why.
- strebler 9y agoI think he's just pointing out how hard it is to be a good active investor, basically exactly what Warren Buffet thinks (and won that bet over).
- lucisferre 9y agoWarran Buffet's opinion isn't relevant here. This is presented as a study providing empirical evidence in support of it's conclusions and as such needs to stand on it's own merit.
- strebler 9y agoGiven the hyperbole and deity references, I thought the article was more for amusement than anything else.
- ocfnash 9y agoI think this article is attempting to make a different point. It essentially argues (unconvincingly IMHO) that it is difficult to _distinguish_ a (very contrived type of) "perfect" active investor from a "bad" investor whereas Buffet argues that it is difficult to _be_ a good active investor. These are not necessarily inconsistent but they do have opposite impacts on investment decisions. To my mind this is dishonest marketing "research" whereas Buffet is making an important point.
- strebler 9y agoOh absolutely, I thought that type of active investor was so contrived that this was just an article written more or less for entertainment (to point out how hard it is to be an active investor).
- ocfnash 9y agoIndeed. Reading my own words, I sound rather more worked up than I am :) I do think this article is a bit sneaky dressing itself up as entertainment since it is published by a business that profits from people deciding to invest. It does provide a means to illustrate the agency problem though. If I had perfect knowledge of the future and had to buy and hold a given set of positions for myself for some fixed period, I would simply choose those that maximised my return at the end. HOWEVER if instead I had to invest on behalf of others (in return for some fee) and was subject to being fired, I would be tempted to choose a different (thus suboptimal) set of positions such as those with smallest drawdown / maximised minimum rolling quarterly Sharpe / ...
- Ntrails 9y agoHis underlying point is broadly right - "past performance is no guarantee of future success" and as such historical (which includes current at the time of making an investment decision) is a fairly poor predictor. The argument that the fund research sellers peddle is that "we recommend based on the investment methodology in use, the processes, risk management, the people, etc etc". Otherwise what would they be doing that a simple google search couldn't? Again, arguably far better metrics to find an active fund that will on average out-perform. They're not wrong.
- jasode 9y ago>how hard it is to be a good active investor, basically exactly what Warren Buffet thinks In broad brush strokes, yes. However this blog post uses a different math scenario. - Warren Buffett's premise for winning the bet was the hedge funds' 2% "management fee" and 20% carry. Therefore, any attempt to beat Warren's passive investing starts with a handicap of minus-2% and has to have bigger positive returns that overcome it. - This essay is about long-term "God clairvoyance" of _eventually_ being correct is negated by short-term negative returns which make people "fire" God. E.g. the investor might have a 2-year lockup of his funds before he can redeem them. E.g. After 2 years, the investor sees that the hedge fund is losing money -- but doesn't realize that it's a temporary dip. Therefore, he redeems his money (aka "fires God") and never got see that God was ultimately correct. (Or put another way, if the lockup period and the fund's entire lifetime were exactly the same, the blog post couldn't be written.)
- kevinmchugh 9y agoI've seen (and implemented in code) some pretty brutal liquidity algorithms. I've no doubt God could use such algorithms to always ensure positive performance on those dates on which liquidation is possible. Funds might be locked up for two years, and afterwards only redeemable on the first day of the fiscal quarter. On the first liquidation event, only 25% of the funds are redeemable. If you submit notice on the first day of the next fiscal quarter, 33% is redeemable, followed by 50% and 100%. If you miss a quarter, the sequence starts over. That one is not even terribly complex.
- inputcoffee 9y agoYou state it much more clearly than the author does. While I would not go so far as to call it "silly". I think an interesting point is obscured for the purpose of a dramatic headline.
- Nokinside 9y agoHaving perfect foresight 5 years in future and constantly rebalancing the portfolio means that the portfolio will never match the perfect foresight. It would invalidate the point that article is making. That kind of strategy could lose money related to index if five year prediction and business cycles cancel each other (think counterphase signal). It would be very interesting to see simulation of perfect foresight rebalancing strategy in different timefrimes.
- Bartweiss 9y agoYep, the 5 year window seems reasonable, but starting from a single point doesn't. It'd be very interesting to see a breakdown of when 'god' would be fired for each of the possible starting points.
- Nokinside 9y agoAgreed. Simulating with sliding window over longer period would tell how the perfect foresight strategy performs. Now it's just single probably hand picked data point.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- roymurdock 9y agofrom the author: "1yr look ahead, rebalance each year? Yes. We also looked at monthly. If you shorten the horizon the returns get silly and the drawdowns go down. At 1yr you can still hit 20%+ dd. At monthly you become a trillionaire with essentially no risk"
- roganp 9y agoThey are trying to say "Please don't fire us - even God would have down years!". Although this depends quite a bit on when you start. They start in 1927, if they started in 1932, God might never be fired.
- sp332 9y agoI think it says that in bold underlined text in the "Conclusions" section at the end.
- dasil003 9y agoIt's clickbait is what it is. They've defined god with these arbitrary restrictions that correlate neither with omniscience nor with what an actual fund manager could know. Obviously even without allowing rebalancing, god could optimize for less-volatility and keep his job while still knocking it out of the park (just slightly less).
- bluGill 9y agoThe point is fund managers often know something is going to happen in the future, but not exactly when. Of course God would know exactly when the market will tank and rebalance accordingly. However a fund manager doesn't have quite that much insight. The fund manager who got the most out of the credit default swaps in the long run had to pull large trick in his fund to prevent his investors from firing him just months before the crash proved he was right. Inf act there was a delay between when the losers realized there was a problem and quit throwing good money after bad and when the investments actually went bad. Even if you invested on the very last date you could, you would have lost money for a short time (I'm not sure how long, probably just a couple weeks) as the losers used every trick they could come up with to prevent the crash.