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Can someone that knows about this stuff explain exactly what it is the CC companies don't want us to know?
by guelo 16y ago
Can someone that knows about this stuff explain exactly what it is the CC companies don't want us to know?
- nuclear_eclipse 16y agoThey don't want you to know that the microchips in their cards can be reprogrammed so that you can wave it at reader and emulate somebody else's CC#, or that you can program any compliant RFID chip to communicate with those wavey card readers to the same effect, or that you can plant an RFID reader on an ATM or similar point and "skim" CC info without needing the user to explicitly swipe their card. That's just a few off the top of my head...
- fragmede 16y agoYou thought credit-card skimming was bad when the skimmer had to be physically attached to the ATM? http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/01/would-you-have-spotted-the-fraud/ http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/01/would-you-have-spotted-th... Now imagine trying to find something that concealable anywhere in a 5 or 10-foot radius of the ATM itself. Hiding the card inside a metal wallet won't help you there.
- reynolds 16y agoSome credit cards use RFID technology to transmit unencrypted data to merchants. I believe PayPass uses RFID tech. Anyone with an RFID scanner can grab your CC info.
- furyg3 16y agoI'm guessing it's: a) RFID is readable from further away than they'd like you to think. b) You don't know when your RFID card is being read. c) Points a and b make tracking you really easy... for anyone to do. d) The only thing that should (ideally) be stored on any RFID chip is a unique number... not any history (recent transactions), personal data (name/phone/picture), or payment system (think public transport) where the actual info about how much money is on the card is stored on the card itself... but that's exactly the type of information which is stored on these cards. e) Nearly all encryption mechanisms are shoddy, either because they're poorly implemented open standards, or developed in-house by the vendor (security through obscurity). Cards that make use of real encryption would be (are?) expensive to make. Here in the Netherlands the entire public transit system is being switched to an RFID-based system, and even to a non-security expert (me) it's clear that the system is based on an insecure premise (d), and would be very vulnerable to unknown scanning by someone wishing to track you from a decent distance (a-b-c). I was interested in the security of this system, and found this video (http://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/events/2378.en.html http://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/events/2378.en.h...) of some hackers who did an amazing job tearing it to shreds. They're pretty adiment that nobody is doing adequate encryption on RFID cards. If you're interested in this at all it's an amazing hack, involving dissolving the cards layer by layer to see the code.
- Groxx 16y agoa) it's a radio signal. However low power it is, it gets transmitted huge distances while still being detectable (especially if you capture it multiple times to read through noise). I'd love to take a massive dish (say, 20 foot diameter) & see how many can be captured from inside a neighboring building. b) I have yet to hear of a single RFID card which has a switch on it to address this. It's a big security problem. I saw one hobbyist hook up an OLED pixel, but that's it. e) I've heard of a couple, very expensive, challenge-response and public-key RFID systems. That is acceptable for authentication, but I've never heard of them actually being used, and one or two were only proofs-of-concept, IIRC. Many (I'd say easily most in use, from what I gather) simply transmit a unique ID, that never changes, which is used to perform X, which is ridiculously insecure.
- pyre 16y ago> I'd love to take a massive dish (say, 20 foot > diameter) & see how many can be captured from > inside a neighboring building. Are you talking about active or passive RFID? I was under the impression that most RFID in use is passive. In that case, you'd have to transmit something to get a response, unless you're talking about camping out in an area where lots of cards are going be activated by various things other than yourself (e.g. entrance to the transit system). But even then the transmitting power of the RFID chip is proportional (?) to the power used to activate it, so something that only expects to read it from 2 feet away isn't going to blast it with enough power to be reliably read from 100 feet away, unless I'm misunderstanding how people do those long distance RFID reading records...
- Groxx 16y agoPassively camping out. Lots of (questionable) RFID uses I've seen are to unlock doors, often external ones. And if it's in a business park, it could easily be closer to 50 feet or less between buildings.
- fragmede 16y agoSo say a 5-foot range. Find a group of employees out for lunch together and I walk past the table with a backpack on. Hardly suspicious, and I've probably got most of their building access cards.
- wrs 16y agoThat their cards may be as insecure as others have proven to be? E.g., http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/london_tube_sma.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/london_tube_sm...
- kjbekkelund 16y agoI wrote an article about the security of passive RFID tags at school about a year ago: http://kimjoar.net/security-passive-rfid-tags.html http://kimjoar.net/security-passive-rfid-tags.html. There you might find some interesting stuff regarding your question. RFID is very cool, but there are still a lot of (unsolved) security problems with them, especially the passive tags.