4 ms·

Because private keys are a far greater tool of proving identity than a SSN, I would argue one should have much greater culpability in an "unauthorized" action.

Because private keys are a far greater tool of proving identity than a SSN, I would argue one should have much greater culpability in an "unauthorized" action. SSNs are lost for good on breaches of companies' infrastructures, but nothing should be lost in a Pub/Priv key scheme. What we'll need is a good key revocation process. So when my identity is compromised (say, malware on a device) then I can be me again.

AckSyn 9y ago
Being able to revoke my SSN would be nice. What would be even better is if the SSA ran as a CA, then my own "SSN" could be my master key, and I could then issue independent sub-(SSN) keys per institution that requests it. Then if a breach were to occure 1) it would be useless to anyone but the agency/company it was issued to, and 2) I could always revoke the key thereby revoking that companies access to it and any damage they may cause to my credit.
random023987 9y ago
> Because private keys are a far greater tool of proving identity than a SSN, I would argue one should have much greater culpability in an "unauthorized" action. If you have the technical know-how to protect your private key, and you're immune from rubber hose attacks, and there's no mechanism for key recovery outside your control, I'd agree. However, people.
- sliverstorm 9y ago
  You wouldn't depend on technical know-how, you'd roll it into a card or something like that. Chip & pin cards already do all of this. And I'm not aware of any system suitable to replace SSN that can withstand rubber hose attacks. That's where law enforcement & the justice department will have to step in, as always.
  - random023987 9y ago
    > You wouldn't depend on technical know-how, you'd roll it into a card or something like that. Chip & pin cards already do all of this. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ring-defeated-the-secure-chip-and-pin-credit-cards/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-r...
    - snuxoll 9y ago
      This attack doesn’t work with smart cards that basically do nothing but act as a HSM. The MITM attack works with a loophole in some EMV cards because the card isn’t signing a transaction request but just saying “PIN is good!” If your card holds a private key and won’t sign anything without also being fed a correct PIN you’d need a proper exploit of the application on the card to defeat it.
- nwellinghoff 9y ago
  Why does the initial attempt of a solution have to work for everyone overnight? Stop the bleeding with those with tech know how first. The the others will come as the solution matures. What is with people wanting to flip the bit all time jezzz. Run two bits!
- vpalanc1 9y ago
  I think what many Americans fail to appreciate is that all the safety guarantees that come with deniability + lax security have a (pretty big) cost, one that YOU are paying in the end. Like - US for a very long while didn't use chip & PIN - but it was simple to deny the transactions and as a consumer you were somewhat well protected, despite lax security. But this generates large costs, and perversely, the cost/uncertainty affects the small businesses the most. Yes, when I use 3DSecure for an online transaction, the bank shifts the burden of proof to me (a correctly-authorized 2-factor transaction cannot be simply challenged with a complaint at the bank, I have to prove that it wasn't me). Still, it's hard to argue that 2-factor for online transactions is consumer-unfriendly, even if the consumer loses the deniability
ballenf 9y ago
You nailed the sentiment that I think the technically inclined get wrong. I respect the position, but think it either fundamentally flawed or just too fast a social transition. By that I mean that we need to educate the masses that a few letters and numbers are as valuable and powerful as the combination to their home safe or keys to their car. People just aren't inclined to exercise the same degree of caution over some gibberish letters as they are the cash in their sock drawer, even though the gibberish is potentially much more valuable. I'm skeptical that such an education is possible without it being ingrained from youth and even then it may be impossible to achieve a high enough degree of understanding to make the kind of shift you envision.
- u801e 9y ago
  If your private key is compromised, then notifying the businesses/government would work as before. Getting a new public certificate would involve going to the government/business in person to get a new one. If people have to go through a lot of trouble, I suspect they would quickly learn a way to minimize the risk of having to do so. I suspect that most people are careful with their passports so that they don't lose them, because it is a bit of a hassle to get a replacement.
  - ballenf 9y ago
    But what about the non-techie who is compromised during a "tech support" scam session or by a phishing email ("This is IRS calling...")? They don't know it's been compromised, don't report it and later have no idea why their reputation is trashed.
    - gnarbarian 9y ago
      the situation is still better because when those people find out they can actually get a new public cert unlike now.
    - dredmorbius 9y ago
      I'd have to see more of how you think such an attack might work, and think of how to defend against it. In general though: 1. The use of a physical authentication mechanism makes exfiltration far more difficult. The problem with passwords is that they can be sniffed with absolutely no awareness by the victim. A device or token you have to have yourself is going to make its absence known. (This presumes it's not cloneable.) 2. That reduces the attack surface for phishing. What I suspect is is that you'd see other forms of attack -- say, trying to get recurring charges inserted into bills or some such, rather than full account access. 3. In the event of token compromise, the ability to determine after the fact that a device was compromised and invalidate the subsequent transactions would be helpful. (Sorting out who bears the risk for that would be an interesting question. I'd like to put the burden on the banks, as they're best positioned to detect such activity.)

AckSyn 9y ago

Being able to revoke my SSN would be nice. What would be even better is if the SSA ran as a CA, then my own "SSN" could be my master key, and I could then issue independent sub-(SSN) keys per institution that requests it. Then if a breach were to occure 1) it would be useless to anyone but the agency/company it was issued to, and 2) I could always revoke the key thereby revoking that companies access to it and any damage they may cause to my credit.

random023987 9y ago

> Because private keys are a far greater tool of proving identity than a SSN, I would argue one should have much greater culpability in an "unauthorized" action. If you have the technical know-how to protect your private key, and you're immune from rubber hose attacks, and there's no mechanism for key recovery outside your control, I'd agree. However, people.

sliverstorm 9y ago
You wouldn't depend on technical know-how, you'd roll it into a card or something like that. Chip & pin cards already do all of this. And I'm not aware of any system suitable to replace SSN that can withstand rubber hose attacks. That's where law enforcement & the justice department will have to step in, as always.
- random023987 9y ago
  > You wouldn't depend on technical know-how, you'd roll it into a card or something like that. Chip & pin cards already do all of this. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ring-defeated-the-secure-chip-and-pin-credit-cards/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-r...
  - snuxoll 9y ago
    This attack doesn’t work with smart cards that basically do nothing but act as a HSM. The MITM attack works with a loophole in some EMV cards because the card isn’t signing a transaction request but just saying “PIN is good!” If your card holds a private key and won’t sign anything without also being fed a correct PIN you’d need a proper exploit of the application on the card to defeat it.
nwellinghoff 9y ago
Why does the initial attempt of a solution have to work for everyone overnight? Stop the bleeding with those with tech know how first. The the others will come as the solution matures. What is with people wanting to flip the bit all time jezzz. Run two bits!
vpalanc1 9y ago
I think what many Americans fail to appreciate is that all the safety guarantees that come with deniability + lax security have a (pretty big) cost, one that YOU are paying in the end. Like - US for a very long while didn't use chip & PIN - but it was simple to deny the transactions and as a consumer you were somewhat well protected, despite lax security. But this generates large costs, and perversely, the cost/uncertainty affects the small businesses the most. Yes, when I use 3DSecure for an online transaction, the bank shifts the burden of proof to me (a correctly-authorized 2-factor transaction cannot be simply challenged with a complaint at the bank, I have to prove that it wasn't me). Still, it's hard to argue that 2-factor for online transactions is consumer-unfriendly, even if the consumer loses the deniability

ballenf 9y ago

You nailed the sentiment that I think the technically inclined get wrong. I respect the position, but think it either fundamentally flawed or just too fast a social transition. By that I mean that we need to educate the masses that a few letters and numbers are as valuable and powerful as the combination to their home safe or keys to their car. People just aren't inclined to exercise the same degree of caution over some gibberish letters as they are the cash in their sock drawer, even though the gibberish is potentially much more valuable. I'm skeptical that such an education is possible without it being ingrained from youth and even then it may be impossible to achieve a high enough degree of understanding to make the kind of shift you envision.

u801e 9y ago
If your private key is compromised, then notifying the businesses/government would work as before. Getting a new public certificate would involve going to the government/business in person to get a new one. If people have to go through a lot of trouble, I suspect they would quickly learn a way to minimize the risk of having to do so. I suspect that most people are careful with their passports so that they don't lose them, because it is a bit of a hassle to get a replacement.
- ballenf 9y ago
  But what about the non-techie who is compromised during a "tech support" scam session or by a phishing email ("This is IRS calling...")? They don't know it's been compromised, don't report it and later have no idea why their reputation is trashed.
  - gnarbarian 9y ago
    the situation is still better because when those people find out they can actually get a new public cert unlike now.
  - dredmorbius 9y ago
    I'd have to see more of how you think such an attack might work, and think of how to defend against it. In general though: 1. The use of a physical authentication mechanism makes exfiltration far more difficult. The problem with passwords is that they can be sniffed with absolutely no awareness by the victim. A device or token you have to have yourself is going to make its absence known. (This presumes it's not cloneable.) 2. That reduces the attack surface for phishing. What I suspect is is that you'd see other forms of attack -- say, trying to get recurring charges inserted into bills or some such, rather than full account access. 3. In the event of token compromise, the ability to determine after the fact that a device was compromised and invalidate the subsequent transactions would be helpful. (Sorting out who bears the risk for that would be an interesting question. I'd like to put the burden on the banks, as they're best positioned to detect such activity.)