I personally think that true OPSEC is impossible in the long-term, simply because it's too easy to slip up or look suspicious from having good OPSEC. I've met a

I personally think that true OPSEC is impossible in the long-term, simply because it's too easy to slip up or look suspicious from having good OPSEC. I've met a few people that had pretty good OPSEC (to the point where I believe they had fake passports, fake backstories and so on). But they all cracked eventually, in one way or another. However, adequate OPSEC is quite doable (but still hard). As with all security, threat models are key. Is your threat model a state actor trying to reveal something about you? Is it a prosecutor or investigator that is particularly vicious? Is it someone you're in a personal relationship with? Is it an unknown adversary with unknown capabilities? And how long do you need to have your strong OPSEC? And so on. With the right threat model and timeline laid out, having strong OPSEC is not impossible. But it's still quite hard. All of that being said, I would not classify any aspect of Levandowski's behaviour as being passable as OPSEC.