>The only point of these rube-goldberg shenanigans is anonymity. Since IPFS is more concerned about performance it flips this on its head Right, but there in l

>The only point of these rube-goldberg shenanigans is anonymity. Since IPFS is more concerned about performance it flips this on its head Right, but there in lies the biggest issue that holds these systems back. Do you: - Replicate and cache data freely between nodes, and by doing so open up scenarios where unpleasant content is stored on and served from people's nodes without their consent OR - Limit replication and storage to elective manual choices made by the user and/or recent data they have explicitly accessed, and in doing so severely compromise the ability of your system to retain and serve data as that data ages. IPFS in it's current state is prone to as much if not more bit rot than the web as a whole - When nodes drop offline the content they have pinned is unlikely to be present on any other nodes unless the original host party has explicitly replicated to other nodes they also control and pin content on. The only solution IPFS has for this currently is manual, elective pinning of content by other network participants. Realistically, if your replication and robustness scheme depends on manual user intervention it's not going to find wide adoption. All of this is fine, IPFS still has usage scenarios it meets well when operating in the state it's currently in. But as far as some ideas being bandied about on how it's producing a censorship-resistant, bit-rot resistant persistent storage infrastructure that might replace HTTP... Nope, not unless a novel solution emerges to this specific problem.