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Radio is also one to many, inherently. And you can do social engineering head games with counter intel officers. Send 37 distinct repeated messages one day...
by VLM 9y ago
Radio is also one to many, inherently.
And you can do social engineering head games with counter intel officers. Send 37 distinct repeated messages one day... that would seem to strongly imply 37 individual agents, but in reality you could have anything from 0 to 1000. OTP message #24256 might be heard by field agents 351 938 and 271 and it means "check your dead drop signal". One agent sees a chalk mark on the street and gets a real message at his dead drop, the other two see nothing and chill. OTP message 91053 could mean "unrestricted warfare begins tomorrow at noon" for all 1000 agents, perhaps. Or maybe OTP message 91053 means nothing, nothing at all and its all head games for counter intel.
There are also chain strategies such as I own a "suspicious" shortwave radio and listen to it (which in some parts of the world that are not USA, is not unusual or suspicious) and when I get OTP message I am to offer my collectible Dale Earnhardt mint condition collectors plate for $1599 on ebay. The agent who's actually doing something interesting is a well known 90s nascar fan and when he sees my collectors plate offered for $1599 on ebay when the going rate is $5, that's when he steals the secrets or pushes the button or whatever. I listen to shortwave which means I could be a spy but all I ever do is try to sell junk on ebay, whereas the "real" agent is an indistinguishable nascar fan.
There are protocols using OTP where the metadata could quite easily give away an agent even if the data is never cracked even with the rubber hose technology. For example imagine a really bad protocol of page number, word number. Won't take long to figure this out when the first number increases at a predictable rate never exceeding 351 pages and the second number never exceeds the number of words on a page. All you need to do is have customs record the number of pages in each book travelers import, and when you figure out the pad rotates at 351 pages you find the guy who entered the country with a 351 page book, and do absolutely nothing other than alert customs to record the exact name and edition of every book he has ever or will ever import, at which point you now have a copy of his one time pad. That's a horrible protocol that uses OTPs, but its hardly the only crackable one that exists.
Personally, given how incredibly cheap it is to transmit numbers over the radio, and how incredibly expensive it is for counterintel to try to figure it out and track it, even if it were obsolete 20 years ago, I'd still keep doing it as a pure economic attack. That counterintel agent listening to numbers is one agent who's not inspecting the contents of suspicious looking icmp packets or multiplayer video game conversations or funny chalk marks in front of libraries or whatever.
- rl3 9y ago>... inspecting the contents of ... multiplayer video game conversations ... I've had this theory that chat in multiplayer games is probably one of the most reliable methods to bypass dragnet surveillance that exists. Figure that most popular chat protocols are reverse engineered and actively captured. Moreover, any crypto usage beyond https will simply flag you. It's concievable that NSA/GCHQ have had people dedicated to reversing videogame chat protocols for some time now, but given the veritable Cambrian explosion of games we've seen in recent years thanks to Steam, I have serious doubts that even major SIGINT agencies can keep up. Their best hope is that the game uses IRC, a cloud service, or some other standardized chat protocol as a backing for its in-game chat. If it's some obscure game with a custom-but-unencrypted chat protocol, I highly doubt it's automatically interpreted. At best the raw data itself is probably captured and stored for a short period of time. It is possible however that they're applying automated methods to anomalous traffic that are able to pull out unencrypted text streams. Of course, why use in-game chat when you could just pick a game that has a way to write out a message in the game itself. Minecraft clones and certain multiplayer paint apps become more or less perfect steganography in that case.
- zdkl 9y agoFaulty assumption. I don't need to pay attention to the tubes if I can look in on your terminal.
- rl3 9y agoThat's why I qualified the statement with dragnet surveillance. Obviously if someone's already targeted it's simple for any self-respecting SIGINT agency to just install implants and get whatever they want. I was describing measures that would likely foil automated bulk analysis. Now if you're implying there's some sort of bulk, indiscriminate implantation program, that would be news to pretty much every private sector security expert on the planet. May as well just tap fiber for appearances at that point.
- zdkl 9y ago> Now if you're implying there's some sort of bulk, indiscriminate implantation program, that would be news to pretty much every private sector security expert on the planet. Are you sure? I thought it was widely accepted that you couldn't trust chinese hardware or most american firmware.