4 ms·
In this case, a more relevant example from World War II might be the exploitation of flaws in the Enigma machine, namely: 1) the re-use of common phrases in we
by iClaudiusX 9y ago
In this case, a more relevant example from World War II might be the exploitation of flaws in the Enigma machine, namely:
1) the re-use of common phrases in weather reports, and
2) the fact that a letter could not be encoded as itself in the ciphertext, providing a mechanism of contradiction that drastically sped up elimination of possible settings
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis_of_the_Enigma#Operating_shortcomings https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis_of_the_Enigma#Op...
Numberphile gives a nice, succinct explanation
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4V2bpZlqx8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4V2bpZlqx8
- roywiggins 9y agoThere's nearly no cryptanalysis that can be done with a properly-arranged one-time-pad scheme. Other than metadata, there's nothing to be learned about the encrypted data. Attacking a one-time-pad is nothing like attacking Enigma. That said, they've been attacked semi-successfully before, due to pad reuse: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venona_project https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venona_project
- lgas 9y agoI think pad reuse would disqualify it from the "properly-arranged one-time-pad scheme" club :)
- lawnchair_larry 9y agoThere is a potential major weakness even with a one time pad, which is exactly why numbers stations are permanently transmitting - side channel information leakage. By observing an increase or decrease in channel activity, you can learn things.
- secfirstmd 9y agoI get the security of one time pads but don't they rely on randonmess at the very start (e.g printing)? So as in many cases the randomness generator is the risk?
- lozenge 9y agoThis is true but randomness is cheap. I can order 1,000 OTPs made from different locations and discard 999. The chances of it being compromised are minimal.