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We're working on standardizing HSTS carve-outs across browsers, which should help improve this process tremendously. The specific parts of google.com that are
by CydeWeys 9y ago
We're working on standardizing HSTS carve-outs across browsers, which should help improve this process tremendously. The specific parts of google.com that are problematic are related to PKI infrastructure for Chrome (CRLs and such) that cannot be served encrypted. Most companies won't have these requirements, fortunately. And we do have many individual subdomains of google.com added to the list individually in lieu of carve-outs: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/net/+/master/http/transport_security_state_static.json#258 https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/net/+/master/...
As for blog.google, that's the beauty of TLD-wide HSTS. You don't need to do anything special on the individual websites, such as configuring headers, to get the benefit of HSTS. All you have to do is set up an SSL cert.
The hstspreload.org site does not yet correctly display results for when a parent has HSTS enabled, but your browser itself does do the right thing. As for fixing what hstspreload.org displays, that's something I might take a crack at: https://github.com/chromium/hstspreload/issues/85 https://github.com/chromium/hstspreload/issues/85
- b3lvedere 9y agoThanks for this awesome reply!