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"Nobody uses DNSSEC" illustrates the tragic failure of imagination among its main critics. This is the same thinking that causes venture capitalists to destroy
by tialaramex 9y ago
"Nobody uses DNSSEC" illustrates the tragic failure of imagination among its main critics. This is the same thinking that causes venture capitalists to destroy loads of modestly successful businesses every year determined to have a one-in-a-million smash rather than make an honest living quietly succeeding.
DNSSEC works fine so long as the people doing the resolving have, or are given, a reason to actually care about the thing it delivers, ie security. Ordinary users are here to see the dancing pig, they aren't going to enable DNSSEC or switch off JavaScript, or use a password to lock their phone, but that doesn't make any of those things useless.
So, two actual applications, of DNSSEC being used today. One, SSHFP. Instead of TOFU with all the risks that implies, or the "fun" of pushing out current key lists to all users if we have DNSSEC we can use SSHFP to put those keys into DNS without anybody tampering with them.
Second CAA. Unlike most DNS records, CAA has deliberately small audience and we can mandate them to implement DNSSEC. Indeed if there was a compelling reason to do so we can mandate that they implement whatever new ECC schemes are making the usual suspects wet themselves this week. You can try this for yourself, set CAA issue to a commercial CA of your choice then try to order a free Let's Encrypt certificate. It says No. Without DNSSEC of course bad guys able to pass a validation can also forge the CAA answer. But with it their forgery is detected, we don't care whether my mother has a working resolver because my mother isn't a trusted CA.
- tptacek 9y agoI think you'll have a tough row to hoe to establish that I don't care about security. More importantly, you haven't addressed the concern I just raised. Whether or not you want your SSH keys to be part of a global PKI whose tops are controlled by world governments, the push for deployment of RSA-only DNSSEC software today does in fact make it harder in the long run to deploy ed25519 DNSSEC. Here are a bunch of arguments against DNSSEC, most of them rooted in security. Which do you find flawed, and why? https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
- kbenson 9y ago> I think you'll have a tough row to hoe to establish that I don't care about security. Now I'm a little disappointed GP wasn't a bit more aggressive in their assertion and targeted it towards you, just so we could get something like cperciva's Putman comeback.[1] ;) 1: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35079 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35079
- darklajid 9y agoReading that and your FAQ for that post led to quite some amusing sites. My favorite so far is this: https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages/20170914-dnssec-name-and-shame.com/ https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages/20170914-dnssec-name-an...
- tialaramex 9y agoDon't stop at proclaiming these to be merely "arguments against DNSSEC" call them what they are, arguments for nihilism. Everything is awful we should give up on the whole enterprise Now, when JWZ does that it's funny because he had the courage of his convictions and now owns a nightclub instead. But if somebody tries to pretend this is a useful basis on which to actually make technical decisions they're having a laugh. Meanwhile those of us who thought it possible to actually make things better rather than pouring scorn have been doing so. Rather than insisting that anything short of perfection is worthless garbage, we have been incrementally improving on the status quo so that the world you described in 2015 now seems distant. On their own Ballot 169, the ACME protocol, expiry of the FPKI cross, RFC6962, the distrust of the last remaining grandfathered CAs, CAA, these are all small things. But assembled they amount to a situation in which the trust needed to make the Web PKI safe has shrunk considerably, and where DNSSEC (but not DANE) comes into its own.
- Panino 9y ago> we can mandate them to implement DNSSEC This is a common theme in DNSSEC -- its main deployment tools are force and financial incentivization. Well those two, and shameless disinformation like DNSSEC is encrypted (DNSSEC is NOT encrypted!), or that it prevents hackers from taking over your website (Godaddy tells its customers this).