3 ms·
The article's not silly. Leveson and Hamilton's works cover that explicitly. Start with Engineering a Safer World's Intent Specifications, move on to Safeware
by brians 9y ago
The article's not silly. Leveson and Hamilton's works cover that explicitly. Start with Engineering a Safer World's Intent Specifications, move on to Safeware, and look at the attention that goes into writing the right TLA+ specs.
Lists like "Government regulations, flaky hardware…" look a lot like the upper levels of the hierarchical control systems contemplated there. It didn't make it into a pop science piece, but it's absolutely core to the work at issue.
You can get a copy of the book at http://sunnyday.mit.edu/safer-world/index.html http://sunnyday.mit.edu/safer-world/index.html .
- SilasX 9y agoIt sounds like you're both in agreement, which would support the criticism of the article, which hides the (addressing of the) very points the parent was raising, and gives the impression that it only solves the very academic version of the problem rather than the real-world software snags.