I understand that you will have to trust the CPU to do any computation. In a sense, it indeed shortens the 'trust stack', and as said in another comment "now, y

I understand that you will have to trust the CPU to do any computation. In a sense, it indeed shortens the 'trust stack', and as said in another comment "now, you need only trust that Intel hasn't backdoored their hardware". Maybe the main point should have been that that this scheme "encourages a centralization of trust into a private key managed by processor manufacturers". You might say that by integrating SGX mechanisms into your security model, you create a set of 'feudal lords' [1] which can wield their power over you. A manufacturer may legitimately establish an enclave in you most trusted hardware which you may not audit or even measure. And if that security model becomes commonplace, for example when only allowing Widevine DRM inside SGX, you eventually cannot use your self-chosen hardware, but will have to pick a feudal lord. [1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/06/more_on_feudal.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/06/more_on_feuda...