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This article is full of choice quotes. The TL;DR is that the NSA through its own actions has violated peoples trust: “I don’t trust the designers,” Israeli del
by phkahler 9y ago
This article is full of choice quotes. The TL;DR is that the NSA through its own actions has violated peoples trust:
“I don’t trust the designers,” Israeli delegate Orr Dunkelman, a computer science professor at the University of Haifa, told Reuters, citing Snowden’s papers. “There are quite a lot of people in NSA who think their job is to subvert standards. My job is to secure standards.”
Chris Mitchell, a member of the British delegation, said he supported Simon and Speck, noting that “no one has succeeded in breaking the algorithms.” He acknowledged, though, that after the Dual EC revelations, “trust, particularly for U.S. government participants in standardization, is now non-existent.”
“How can we expect companies and citizens to use security algorithms from ISO standards if those algorithms come from a source that has compromised security-related ISO standards just a few years ago?” - Christian Wenzel-Benner.
These are coming from Israel, Britain, and Germany - all close US allies.
I'm not a crypto guy, but I looked at Speck. The code is really clean and efficient. If it's secure that's really awesome. But how is anyone supposed to trust it given the past actions of its creator?
- tptacek 9y agoThey have a budget denominated in the tens of billions of dollars. How do you know that they didn't publish a simple, clean, efficient ARX cipher design specifically to get people to avoid a design that they knew they'd have trouble beating? They can clearly afford that level of cleverness.
- betterunix2 9y agoKeep in mind that the past actions of the NSA also include strengthening DES and strengthening SHA-1. The NSA also designed Skipjack for public use (in the Clipper chip), which was eventually declassified, and which was apparently designed in good faith and remains secure (up to the 80 bit level it was designed for). Also keep in mind that the DUAL_EC backdoor was discovered within a year of its publication; SIMON and SPECK were published years ago and nobody has found or suggested a backdoor (plenty of people have been analyzing the ciphers). ARX designs have been proposed by plenty of other cryptographers, so nothing about the SIMON or SPECK designs would immediately raise eyebrows other than the fact that the NSA proposed them. Personally, I doubt that the effort to subvert standards involves backdoors, which are pretty hard to hide and pretty easy to avoid (DUAL_EC is the only credible candidate for a backdoor, it was discovered quickly, and it was not widely used). It seems more likely that the effort involves (this is all speculation): 1. Making standards more complex than necessary. 2. Making standards more sensitive to bad randomness (e.g. DSA signatures). 3. Making standards where constant-time implementations are harder or slower. In other words, they have pushed for standards that are harder to securely implement and easy to use insecurely. Why bother with backdoors when you can exploit common and easy-to-make mistakes? Given their expertise in spotting and exploiting these kinds of bugs, the NSA can probably satisfy the "information assurance" mission by vetting / correcting implementations used by the government, at least for the most important government secrets (most government communication would just use COTS; of course, most government communication is of limited value to foreign governments).
- phkahler 9y agoAgreed. My non-expert suspicion is that Speck is secure and simple. The point is that we can no longer assume that's the case coming from the NSA and people in other countries don't trust them. One could get out their tinfoil hat (as another posterdid) and suggest that the allies are publicly questioning it so people don't adopt simple and secure encryption. After all, the result of their vote is that it does not become a standard. In the end we have to go by actual analysis. As it should be.
- s_dev 9y ago>But how is anyone supposed to trust it given the past actions of its creator? I would have presumed a lack of trust was the default mentality when evaluating any security based algorithm -- after all any CS professor could be in the NSA's pocket.