It seems like the compromise (dispose of the more lightweight versions while retaining the "most robust" version) still leaves the possibility of an NSA-known v

It seems like the compromise (dispose of the more lightweight versions while retaining the "most robust" version) still leaves the possibility of an NSA-known vulnerability. Maybe the "most robust" version is harder for the NSA to break, maybe the NSA doesn't know of a way to break it, or maybe the NSA just proposed the lightweight versions so they'd have room to negotiate, and have just achieved exactly what they hoped. I'm glad other countries are suspicious of the NSA, but I'm not sure that distrust goes far enough. Bruce Schneier's [thanks tptacek] 2013 opinion on the presence of an NSA-known backdoor: "maybe, but I don't think so." His post today is also interesting, saying the ISO "rejects" (which seems a bit stronger than the source article): https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/iso_rejects_nsa.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/iso_rejects_n... He concludes [2017]: "I don't trust the NSA, either."