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> If there's anything it is like to be a worm, THAT'S the hard problem. I am not convinced - I suspect that there isn't anything to the experience of being lik
by mannykannot 9y ago
> If there's anything it is like to be a worm, THAT'S the hard problem.
I am not convinced - I suspect that there isn't anything to the experience of being like a worm; that the very question presupposes self-awareness of some sort. I suspect the hard problem of consciousness might lie in the self-referentiality of self-aware consciousness (though alternatively or in addition, it might be on account of its workings being inaccessible to introspection.)
But our consciousness goes beyond simple self-awareness: having a theory of mind is a step beyond (and is realizing that others have a theory of mind a step beyond that?) Our own experience of our own consciousness is several steps removed from what a worm might experience.
> We need new words - or wider usage of existing ones.
Yes; I think the words we use are definitely an issue, perhaps because we don't remember what it was like to be an aware, but not self-aware, infant. To some people, anything that responds to external stimuli is conscious, while to others on the other extreme, consciousness entails being able to verbalize it. This might be the only case where the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is actually correct - that our ability to think about the issue is constrained by our language.
In short, I think the author of the article made heavy weather of the issue by conflating consciousness with simple awareness, and not recognizing that meta-consciousness, and perhaps even an awareness of meta-consciousness, is an essential part of what distinguishes what is commonly meant by consciousness from mere awareness.
In case I haven't made myself clear, I don't think the hard problem of consciousness has been solved by invoking meta-consciousness; on the contrary, I think that is where the difficulty is most apparent.
- language 9y ago> But our consciousness goes beyond simple self-awareness: having a theory of mind is a step beyond (and is realizing that others have a theory of mind a step beyond that?) That [and this] whole space [of considerations, here] appears to be fraught with circularities like this: Step 1. Draw a distinction between consciousness and meta-consciousness. Step 2. "From what vantage point, and with what 'machinery' do we make a distinction?" Step 3. Go back to Step 1. > .. that our ability to think about the issue is constrained by our language. I think I agree, otherwise I'm tempted to think that we would have already arrived, trivially, at some clearer kind of agreement about it.
- mannykannot 9y agoTo be clear, I don't think there is an infinite recursion here, but I do think that consciousness, as we experience it, is several steps beyond merely responding to stimuli. It just crossed my mind that perhaps 'our ability to think about the issue is constrained by our language' and '[consciousness'] workings being inaccessible to introspection' are the same thing.
- language 9y ago> .. that perhaps 'our ability to think about the issue is constrained by our language' and '[consciousness] workings being inaccessible to introspection' are the same thing. I like to think about it that way, but it makes the problem feel intractable. The problem is that we want to describe consciousness as "that thing that allows an organism to describe consciousness as 'that thing that allows an organism to describe consciousness as ´that thing that allows an organism to describe consciousness as [...]´'"
- svara 9y agoExactly. That's why we keep going in circles when talking about these things, and why people have been repeating themselves for hundreds of years, yet the problem still seems fresh. I wish I had something more substantive to add, but I have really come to think of this as a fundamental limit to thinking. It's sort of analogous to starting with a set of axioms, then trying to derive explanations for these axioms from them. This sounds defeatist, but I have yet to read a good argument for why trying to explain the "hard problem" is anything else than that. I guess you could see this in a sort of mystical light and build something spiritual around it, too...
- pixl97 9y ago"Consciousness is the ability of an organism to predict the future" The problem of looking at human consciousness is similar to someone that knows little about computer processors pulling apart an I7 and trying to figure meaningful things about what is going on inside. Without knowing the history of processor design, there will be huge information gaps on why some parts work the way they do. That said, I believe consciousness is just world modeling, which explains the recursion problem you run into, a good model can simulate itself (nested Turing machines). As creatures evolved the ones that didn't just react, but could predict properly had better survival outcomes. Predictive models competed with each other and the 'best' ones survived, until after millions of years one branch of these models became complex enough to self reference itself.
- visarga 9y ago> I suspect that there isn't anything to the experience of being like a worm Even a worm has goals to attain - food and reproduction. In order to attain those goals, it needs to have perceptions and to rank those by the estimated return value. That is what it's like to be a worm.
- lomnakkus 9y ago> That's like saying a dead worm and a live worm are not so different. What? No. > If there is a difference in how they evolve, there is a something to be like it because it has to have some kind of perception and action selection mechanism. What it's like to be a worm is the perception stream evaluated by the value function of the worm. Assuming that by "evolve" you mean "evolve as a dynamical system", then yes.
- visarga 9y agoYes, that's what I mean. I deliberated a lot about using "act" or "react" but it doesn't apply to inert objects as well.
- mannykannot 9y agoTalking about a worm as if it had goals is a teleological analogy that makes discussing its behavior easier, but I think it is a mistake to take this usage literally. If you do, you must also conclude that a thermostat has a goal, and therefore (by your argument) that there is a something that is what it is like to be a thermostat. I can only see this line of argument as a distraction that will only confuse any attempt to understand consciousness. The rest of this discussion is hard to follow because it has apparently been edited, but you can't draw a line between applying your argument to animate things, but not inanimate ones, simply by choosing one word over another.
- visarga 9y agoYes, you can draw a very clean line. It's the line of self-replication. Self-replicators have an internal goal - that is to maintain their existence by growing and replicating. The more advanced ones develop complex responses to changes in their environments. Humans are just the apex of this process. A toaster or a thermostat don't self reproduce, so they have no goals. Having no goals, means no consciousness, because goals are shaping the development of consciousness.
- lomnakkus 9y ago> I suspect that there isn't anything to the experience of being like a worm; that the very question presupposes self-awareness of some sort. It also presupposes that you are a worm. It's a (logically) absurd and (practically) pointless question. How could anyone/anything possibly know what it's like to be a worm without actually having the experience of being one? Answer: They couldn't/can't. The question also has no relevance to consciousness. We know what it's like to be conscious humans because we are conscious humans and we do have human experiences.