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How ironic, the founder of Telegram - Telegram! - calling into question Signal's crypto. Telegram's crypto is a complete question mark. I wouldn't be surprised

by Fej 9y ago

How ironic, the founder of Telegram - Telegram! - calling into question Signal's crypto. Telegram's crypto is a complete question mark. I wouldn't be surprised if it's backdoored by Russian intelligence.

miaklesp 9y ago
Questioning Signal's crypto is gross? Why Telegram crypto is a complete question mark but Signal crypto is unquestionable? Maybe otherwise, Signal backdoored to US intelligence?
- dna_polymerase 9y ago
  Because the Signal Crypto Protocol is completely open & the client is open source. A backdoor in Signal would require the keys to be exported to the Signal servers (by compromising the source code), which would be visible to every open source developer.
  - DiThi 9y ago
    And Telegram Crypto Protocol and client are not? I'm using Telegram client compiled from sources right now... Edit: The main problem with Telegram is not the crypto, but the fact that end-to-end crypto is not used by default. Except with calls, those are always end to end encrypted.
baybal2 9y ago
They don't need to backdoor it. The re-transmission with a different key feature is the very definition of a vulnerability. For as long any encryption protocol allows for it to happen, one can trigger a key renegotiation that can be taped. And it was used few times already. Some of such occurrences were well documented. In 2015, in a lobby discussion on DEFCON two people confronted Marlinspike about the retransmission vulnerability in the Signal. He was asked to give a _yes or no answer_ to whether the central server can trigger the key renegotiation by sending the "I lost my phone" command to both parties. And he answered this question _no_. This was long before the Guardian lashed at FB with the backdoor article. I personally verified this account with 2 people. Marlinspike Moxie is a liar.
- willstrafach 9y ago
  That is incorrect. You are talking about a design chouce in WhatsApp which is explicitly not a problem in Signal.
  - baybal2 9y ago
    Yes, this happens automatically in whatsapp. In Signal, you will be prompted to confirm the new key. Still, _it is possible to trigger this process for a third party_, and then to MITM the key exchange.
    - problems 9y ago
      Actually, in Signal more recently now you don't even get to confirm the new key, it just says "hey, the key changed" in the conversation text and keeps going. I'm not exactly comfortable with this now - it seems like someone may be able to spam messages to hide the key change.
      - LurkersWillLurk 9y ago
        If you manually verify safety numbers and mark your contact as verified, it will hard-stop you and require confirmation if your contact's identity key changes afterwards.
Dolores12 9y ago
Why are you scared of Russian intelligence? will they take you to Guam?

by Fej 9y ago

miaklesp 9y ago

Questioning Signal's crypto is gross? Why Telegram crypto is a complete question mark but Signal crypto is unquestionable? Maybe otherwise, Signal backdoored to US intelligence?

dna_polymerase 9y ago
Because the Signal Crypto Protocol is completely open & the client is open source. A backdoor in Signal would require the keys to be exported to the Signal servers (by compromising the source code), which would be visible to every open source developer.
- DiThi 9y ago
  And Telegram Crypto Protocol and client are not? I'm using Telegram client compiled from sources right now... Edit: The main problem with Telegram is not the crypto, but the fact that end-to-end crypto is not used by default. Except with calls, those are always end to end encrypted.

baybal2 9y ago

They don't need to backdoor it. The re-transmission with a different key feature is the very definition of a vulnerability. For as long any encryption protocol allows for it to happen, one can trigger a key renegotiation that can be taped. And it was used few times already. Some of such occurrences were well documented. In 2015, in a lobby discussion on DEFCON two people confronted Marlinspike about the retransmission vulnerability in the Signal. He was asked to give a _yes or no answer_ to whether the central server can trigger the key renegotiation by sending the "I lost my phone" command to both parties. And he answered this question _no_. This was long before the Guardian lashed at FB with the backdoor article. I personally verified this account with 2 people. Marlinspike Moxie is a liar.

willstrafach 9y ago
That is incorrect. You are talking about a design chouce in WhatsApp which is explicitly not a problem in Signal.
- baybal2 9y ago
  Yes, this happens automatically in whatsapp. In Signal, you will be prompted to confirm the new key. Still, _it is possible to trigger this process for a third party_, and then to MITM the key exchange.
  - problems 9y ago
    Actually, in Signal more recently now you don't even get to confirm the new key, it just says "hey, the key changed" in the conversation text and keeps going. I'm not exactly comfortable with this now - it seems like someone may be able to spam messages to hide the key change.
    - LurkersWillLurk 9y ago
      If you manually verify safety numbers and mark your contact as verified, it will hard-stop you and require confirmation if your contact's identity key changes afterwards.

Dolores12 9y ago

Why are you scared of Russian intelligence? will they take you to Guam?