> But who would use the build service? The consumer of the software or the publisher? Publisher. A user could (if they were really paranoid) rebuild the packag

> But who would use the build service? The consumer of the software or the publisher? Publisher. A user could (if they were really paranoid) rebuild the packages locally, with two or three commands. > Also that protects you against malware injecting binaries in an executable when compiling it, but not from malware injecting code into the source code of the executable. You can download the source code that OBS used (both as a src RPM generated by the builder and the OBS repo that the builder was given read-only access to), and OBS supports cryptographic signatures of the originating source (with gpg-offline keys to avoid WoT attacks). If your developers are using sane source control practices (use GPG keys for every commit, but especially tags) then you are protected against that too. Of course, reproducible builds is something that would solve this problem even better (protecting against attacks on OBS that cause it to add source that are not in the repo). As a side point, our threat model doesn't fully trust the nodes compiling the software so such attacks are fairly limited in scope (but I'm not a developer of OBS so I'm really not the right person to be asked these questions).