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I have never seen any study that can do traffic correlation of encrypted traffic for real world data. The combination of parallel connections (Firefox has 6), m
by belorn 9y ago
I have never seen any study that can do traffic correlation of encrypted traffic for real world data. The combination of parallel connections (Firefox has 6), multiple tabs, ajax calls and background polls, all makes the real world very hard to separate the data to any sensible detection rate.
What I have seen is people being able to detect data when each high level request can be cleanly separated.
- dannyw 9y agoTor Hidden Services tend to be run with NoScript set to disable, so there's no ajax nor background polls.
- cat199 9y agothis is a security agency - what makes you think you would have seen it? multiple intercept locations + timing information + flow size captures + crawling data from destination sites + a big honking graph database would probably get someone with deep pockets fairly far as far as fingerprinting.. from here, select various targets and add more traditional methods and you've got yourself a pretty good 'lets see whats going on with the key players' sort of tool..
- belorn 9y agoI have seen statements both Snowden and Schneier that say that security and in particular encryption works but the attacker only need a single point of failure and security agencies generally bypass rather than break security measures. But we are talking about a specific attack vector here: Correlation attacks. flow size captures and destination site fingerprints are great if the traffic can be isolated. Imagine a actually fingerprint. A computer will transform the image into specific dot values, and from there create a unique value. Now imagine you put 100 different fingerprints with the exact same outer finger shape on top of each other. No method will be able to say with confidence if a specific fingerprint is in it, regardless deep pockets and honking databases. But there are a few catches. Reduce the number of simultaneous signals and the problem goes down. If you can introduce additional traffic into the signal, you can often isolate the traffic you are interested in. While we can never know with certainty what the big agencies can do, the general advice I have heard is to not send a single message through the tor network and always do it as a part of multiple simultaneous messages (both for sender and receiver).
- cat199 9y ago> I have never seen any study that can do traffic correlation of encrypted traffic for real world data. I take your 'not seen', and raise you a several years old snowden publish.